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Integrative complexity has been shown to influence information-processing and 
decision-making in different social situations. The present research assessed the 
effects of group status and cognitive appraisal prime on complexity in a group 
decision-making context. Experiment 1 assessed group status effects, and Experiment 
2 tested whether priming threat or challenge would moderate those effects. Both 
experiments found that minority members showed greater complexity than majority 
members. Experiment 2 found that appraisal prime moderated the relationship 
between status and complexity. Minority members receiving the threat prime were the 
most complex, while majority members in the threat and control conditions were the 
least complex. The mediating roles of cognitive appraisal, anxiety, and coping 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Integrative complexity is not a variable that is frequently discussed in social 
psychology textbooks, but it is an important variable to study. Social psychologists 
have a long history of studying social influence and decision-making, and integrative 
complexity is a variable that is quite relevant to the study of how social influences 
may affect our thoughts and behaviors. Psychologists have studied not only how 
individuals make decisions in their everyday lives, but have also focused on how 
those in positions of power (e.g. politicians, military commanders, etc.) reach 
decisions about important issues (Suedfeld & Granatstein, 1995; Suedfeld, Corteen, 
& McCormick, 1986; Suedfeld, Wallace, & Thachuk, 1993). Suedfeld and 
Granatstein (1995) made the following point to highlight the importance of studying 
decision-making by those in power: 
 On the level of history, political science, and sociology, the  
 performance of governmental and other leaders in collecting and  
 evaluating information and selecting solution strategies for important  
 problems has crucial impact on all aspects of the well-being of their  
 society. (p. 509) 
One poignant example of how this variable is applicable to the field of social 
psychology involves the debate that led to the decision of the United States of 
America to invade Iraq and remove its leader from power. Did those who favored the 
war--the majority in Congress at the time (as well President G.W. Bush’s 
administration)--present a more or less complex argument for the invasion, and was 




group--present a more or less complex case for their view, and was this a specific 
strategy? Has the structure of their arguments changed since the onset of the war, and 
whose arguments proved to be more effective in persuading constituents to support 
or oppose the invasion of Iraq? How might the structure and complexity of these 
arguments (and others) have impacted the most recent presidential elections in the 
U.S.?   
It is important to understand how and why group status affects decision 
making and policy reasoning, how and why majority and minority groups react 
differentially to policies that may threaten their values, and how and why these 
factors affect intergroup relations as well as influence voters and shape their opinions 
about issues. As scientists gain more insight into how cognitive style is influenced by 
motivational and situational factors, perhaps we could learn more about developing 
successful, creative solutions to policy issues that are more effective, as well as less 
polarizing and divisive. 
Overview 
Integrative complexity was once viewed solely as a cognitive, individual 
difference variable, where those low in integrative complexity were described as 
being reliant on rigid, evaluative rules, and those high in complexity were described 
as being able and willing to consider evidence from multiple perspectives (Tetlock, 
Armor, & Peterson, 1994; Gruenfeld, 1995).   
More recently, however, researchers have found that situational factors 
clearly affect integrative complexity (Tetlock et al., 1994; Gruenfeld, 1995; 




Gruenfeld et al. (1998) have found that, within discussion groups, majority members 
(those who share the majority opinion within a group) show higher levels of 
complexity after a group discussion, whereas minority members show lower levels.  
What is not clear, however, is how people interpret different social situations. 
For instance, individuals may interpret certain types of situations as threatening 
(Gruenfeld, 1995; Gruenfeld et al., 1998; Skinner & Brewer, 2002). Gruenfeld and 
colleagues (Gruenfeld et al., 1998; Gruenfeld, 1995) speculated that perceptions of 
threat could play a role in the observed group differences in integrative complexity, 
but they did not examine the potential link between threat and complexity.  
One potential variable related to this idea of threat is cognitive appraisal. 
Cognitive appraisals have traditionally been defined as dispositions or “styles” used 
to assess ongoing relationships with the environment, but researchers have recently 
found that appraisals also vary according to different situations (Tomaka, 
Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 1993). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) posited that two 
types of state appraisals--threat appraisals and challenge appraisals--occur in 
anticipation of stressful situations. Tomaka et al. (1993) theorized that “threatened” 
individuals should be more likely to perceive a potential for loss, while “challenged” 
individuals are more likely to focus on potential gains. Challenged individuals 
should be energized and eager to perform well, while threatened people should 
anticipate a loss and exhibit decreased ability or motivation to perform well on a 
goal-relevant task (Tomaka et al., 1993).   
 Although psychologists who study cognitive appraisals have suggested that 




Hunter, 2002; Skinner & Brewer, 2002; Corenblum & Stephan, 2001), prior research 
did not assess the role of cognitive appraisal as a mediator of the relationship between 
group status and complexity. These experiments were designed to investigate the 
potential mediating (as well as moderating) role of cognitive appraisal (see Figures 1 






































































Figure 2. Experiment 2: Path diagram of proposed model. 
The present research also examined the role of anxiety as a second potential 
mediating variable (see Figures 1 and 2). Anxiety has previously been associated 
with threat appraisals, and perceptions of anxiety have been found to impact 
performance on a variety of tasks (Alpert & Haber, 1960; Couch, Garber, & Turner, 
1983, as cited in Skinner & Brewer, 2002).  
Finally, coping expectancy was a third potential mediating variable that was 























confidence in one’s ability to cope with the demands of a stressful situation, has been 
linked to both cognitive appraisal and anxiety in past research (Lazarus, 1991; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Tomaka et al., 1993; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & 
Ernst, 1997; Bandura; 1997, Skinner & Brewer, 1999; Skinner & Brewer, 2002).  
Challenge appraisals, for example, have been associated with greater levels of coping 
expectancy, while threat appraisals and higher anxiety levels have both been 
associated with a decrease in coping expectancy (Skinner & Brewer, 2002; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Tomaka et al., 1993; Tomaka et al., 1997; Bandura, 
1997; Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981).  
One goal of the first experiment was to test the hypothesis that cognitive 
appraisal (threat appraisal vs. challenge appraisal) mediates the relationship between 
group status and integrative complexity. This experiment was designed to investigate 
whether minority members within a group would perceive a specific situation (such 
as a group discussion) as more threatening than majority members, and therefore 
demonstrate lower complexity levels when writing their opinion on a social issue. 
Majority members, on the other hand, were expected to perceive the same situation 
as more challenging, and therefore exhibit higher complexity levels.   
A second goal of the first experiment was to test whether anxiety mediates 
the relationship between group status and complexity. It was predicted that majority 
members would report less anxiety, which would lead them demonstrate greater 
complexity in their thinking, whereas minority group members would be more 




A third goal of the first experiment was to test whether coping expectancy 
mediates the relationship between group status and complexity. It was predicted that 
majority members would perceive a greater ability to cope with the demands of a 
potentially stressful situation, which would lead to greater complexity of thought; 
minority group members, on the other hand, were expected to report less confidence 
in their ability to cope, which was expected to result in less complex thinking. 
A primary goal of the second experiment was to test the hypothesis that 
manipulating participants’ interpretations of the situation would lead to 
corresponding changes in complexity levels, thereby attenuating the expected main 
effect of group status. This experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that 
cognitive appraisal (threat/challenge) prime moderates the relationship between 
group status and integrative complexity (see Figure 2). An interaction between 
appraisal prime and group status on levels of integrative complexity was predicted. 
Both status groups (majority and minority) in the challenge prime conditions were 
expected to show higher complexity, and both groups in the threat prime conditions 
were expected to show lower complexity. In the control (no prime) conditions, as 
shown in prior research (see Gruenfeld et al., 1998), majority members were 
expected to demonstrate higher complexity levels (similar to those in the challenge 
conditions), while minority members were expected to show lower levels (similar to 
those in the threat conditions).  
This experiment also tested whether cognitive appraisal mediates the 
interaction between group status and cognitive appraisal (threat/challenge) prime. It 




threat, which would lead to lower levels of complexity. Conversely, those in the 
challenge prime conditions were expected to report greater levels of challenge, 
which was expected to lead to greater complexity. In the control conditions, it was 
anticipated that minority members (like those in the threat conditions) would report 
higher threat levels, which would lead to less complexity, and majority members 
(like those in the challenge conditions) would report lower threat levels, which 
would lead to greater complexity. It also examined whether cognitive appraisal was a 
mediator of the relationship between threat/challenge prime and integrative 
complexity, and whether it was a mediator of the relationship between group status 
and integrative complexity. 
The second experiment tested whether anxiety was a mediator of complexity 
as well. It was predicted that those in the threat prime conditions would show greater 
anxiety, which would lead to less complexity, and that those in the challenge prime 
conditions would show less anxiety, leading to greater complexity. In the control 
conditions, minorities were expected to report higher anxiety (similar to those in the 
threat conditions), and exhibit lower levels of complexity. Majority members in the 
control condition (similar to those in the challenge conditions) were expected to 
report less anxiety, and exhibit higher levels of integrative complexity. 
Finally, the second experiment also investigated whether the threat/challenge 
prime manipulation led to higher or lower levels of coping expectancy, and whether 
coping expectancy was a mediator of complexity. Individuals in the threat prime 
conditions were expected to show lower levels of coping expectancy, which should 




show greater levels of coping expectancy, resulting in greater complexity. In the 
control conditions, minorities were expected to report lower levels of coping 
expectancy (similar to those in the threat conditions), and demonstrate lower 
complexity levels. Majority members in the control condition were expected to 
report higher levels of coping expectancy (similar to those in the challenge 
conditions), and exhibit higher levels of complexity. 
The main purpose of these experiments was to investigate the effects of 
group status and cognitive appraisal (threat/challenge) prime on complexity, as well 
as the potential mediating roles of cognitive appraisal, anxiety, and coping 
expectancy, in order to better understand how people think under potentially stressful 
conditions. The first experiment was designed to investigate whether group status 
would influence levels of integrative complexity, and whether the proposed 
mediators would mediate the relationship between group status and complexity. The 
second experiment was designed to examine whether a threat/challenge prime would 
moderate the relationship between group status and complexity. It also examined the 
possibility that the proposed mediators would mediate the interaction between group 
status and cognitive appraisal prime on integrative complexity. Additionally, it 
investigated whether cognitive appraisal mediated the relationship between a 
threat/challenge prime and integrative complexity, as well as whether it mediated the 
relationship between group status and complexity. Thus, the second experiment 
tested whether cognitive appraisal, anxiety, and coping expectancy were mediators 
of integrative complexity, and whether they mediated the moderation effect for status 




Integrative Complexity  
Integrative complexity has most frequently been presented as a positive and 
desirable personality variable, characterized by a pragmatic and open-minded 
worldview (see Tetlock, 1984). The concept of integrative complexity originally 
came about as an attempt to identify “styles of social thinking” that vary among 
individuals (Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry, 1993), and much of the past research on 
integrative complexity has focused on complexity as an individual difference 
variable. Psychologists have posited that individuals who prefer a simpler thinking 
style should form dichotomous impressions of people and issues (e.g. black vs. white, 
right vs. wrong). Researchers have also proposed that other individuals, in contrast to 
those who are more single-minded in their thinking, maintain a more flexible, 
multidimensional worldview and are aware that life is full of “inconsistencies and 
contradictions”. These more complex thinkers may consider that individuals have 
different motives and goals that underlie their behavior, and they may weigh 
conflicting views when making decisions (Tetlock et al., 1993).  
 The term, “integrative complexity” has long been defined in terms of 
evaluative differentiation and conceptual integration (Tetlock et al., 1994). 
Integrative complexity is a cognitive variable that represents two dimensions—
evaluative differentiation and conceptual integration (Tetlock et al., 1994). 
Differentiation requires a demonstration of basic dialectical reasoning, and 
conceptual integration requires a display of reasoning built upon differentiations. 
Conceptual integration, therefore, cannot occur without differentiation, but 




According to Lee and Peterson (1997), integrative complexity is described 
such that low levels are associated with a simplistic view of events, where one view 
is seen as correct, and all other views are considered “illegitimate, flawed, or 
ridiculous” (p. 963).  High levels, in contrast, are linked to an acknowledgement of 
many perspectives, and an ability to connect divergent views. Suedfeld and 
Granatstein (1995) further described integrative complexity as referring to, “the 
extent to which decision-makers search for and monitor information, try to predict 
outcomes and reactions, flexibly weigh their own and other parties’ options, and 
consider potential strategies (p. 510). 
An example of a low-complexity opinion statement (one that demonstrates 
low differentiation and lacks integration) is:  
  Abortion is a basic right that should be available to all women. To  
  limit a  woman’s access to an abortion is an intolerable infringement  
  on her civil liberties. To do so would be to threaten the separation of  
  church and state so fundamental to the American way of life. (p. 965,  
  Lee & Peterson, 1997, as adapted from Tetlock, 1983) 
An example of a medium complexity statement, which shows high 
differentiation but low integration, is: “Many see abortion as a basic civil liberty that 
should be available to any women who chooses to exercise this right. Others, 
however, see abortion as infanticide.” (p. 965, Lee & Peterson, 1997, as adapted 
from Tetlock, 1983) 
Finally, an example of a statement that illustrates high integrative complexity 




  Some view abortion as a civil liberties issue; others see abortion as  
  tantamount to  murder. One’s view of abortion depends on a  
  complicated mixture of legal, moral, philosophical, and perhaps  
  scientific judgments. Is there a constitutional right to abortion? What  
  criteria should be used to determine when human life begins? Who  
  possesses the authority to resolve these issues? (p. 965, Lee &  
  Peterson, asadapted from Tetlock, 1983) 
 Associations between integrative complexity and behavioral variables were 
the focus of psychologists’ early research on complexity (Tetlock et al., 1993). For 
example, with regard to decision making and quality of decisions, researchers found 
that integratively complex thinkers were better able to make agreements that benefit 
both sides in mixed-motive games, and were also viewed as sensitive to the concerns 
of the other side (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975, as cited in Tetlock et al., 1993; see also 
Tetlock et al., 1993). Correlations between integrative complexity and personality 
variables have also been investigated. For instance, differences in individuals’ 
integrative complexity levels have been attributed to ideological orientation and 
related personality variables such as authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, 
Levinson, and Sanford, 1950; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock, Bernzweig, & Gallant, 1985; 
Tetlock, Hannum, & Micheletti, 1984). Researchers have also found that individuals 
with Type A personalities are less integratively complex thinkers than those with 
Type B personalities (Bruch, McCann, & Harvey, 1991, as cited in Feist, 1994).  
Many researchers (e.g. McAdams, 1990, as cited in Tetlock et al., 1993) have 




see the world in more sophisticated terms. Tetlock et al. (1993) summarized this 
point, stating, “the most widely held view of integrative complexity appears to be the 
more, the better” (p. 501). 
  In fact, integrative complexity has often been associated with better 
performance in many domains. For example, integrative complexity has been 
positively associated with “more effective information search, greater creativity, 
better team performance, and less susceptibility to prejudice “(p. 106, Tadmor, 
Tetlock, & Peng, 2009; see also Streufert & Nogami, 1989). Those who are more 
complex have also been identified as better able to predict others’ behavior, and may 
be more prepared to accommodate stress (Suedfeld & Piedrahita, 1984, as cited in 
Lee & Peterson, 1997). This is possibly because those who think more complexly 
attend to more information (including divergent or contrasting viewpoints). 
 Furthermore, complex thinkers may be more resistant to suggestion and 
manipulation, as they are less influenced by any particular, single event (Lee & 
Peterson, 1997). Researchers (e.g. de Vries & Walker, 1986; Sullivan, McCullough, 
& Stager, 1970, as cited in Tetlock et al., 1993) have additionally found some 
evidence that complexity levels are positively but moderately intercorrelated with ego 
development and Kohlberg’s model of moral development. All of these findings 
suggest that integrative complexity should be a highly desirable thinking style. 
However, Tetlock and colleagues (1993) felt it was important to investigate 
and identify both positive and negative characteristics of complex and simple 
thinking styles. Tetlock et al. (1993) conducted an assessment study that involved 




program. Based on their findings, which involved self-ratings, observations by trained 
personality-staff members, and content analysis of writing samples, the researchers 
developed a profile of complex thinkers as independent, creative, open to new 
experiences, and able to bring “disparate ideas” together. On the downside, those who 
were high in complexity were also seen as more narcissistic, hostile, exploitative of 
others’ weaknesses, and power-hungry. Complex thinkers also rated themselves as 
low on measures of compliance, responsibility and orderliness.  
Tetlock et al. (1993) also concluded that complex thinkers are less predictable 
and less stable in behavior, and may be more self-directed and independent in making 
judgments when faced with conformity pressures. However, they may also be seen as 
excessively intellectual, impractical and indecisive (Tetlock et al., 1993).  
Observers rated simple thinkers as being warm, giving, orderly, self-
controlled, deliberate, and socially compliant; from a more negative standpoint, 
simple thinkers were seen as acquiescent, suggestible, and unimaginative (Tetlock et 
al., 1993). Simple thinkers may also be more decisive and quicker to recognize they 
have reached “the point of diminishing returns” for further thought about an issue, 
and they are seen as good team players. Alternatively, they may be more willing to 
jump to conclusions and to change their minds--demonstrating cognitive impulsivity 
and rigidity--and may be more susceptible to extreme in-group loyalty and 
authoritarianism (Tetlock et al., 1993). These findings also suggests that simple 
thinkers may have a higher need for closure (see Kosic, Kruglanski, Pierro, & 





 Other researchers have also identified negative associations with both high 
and low complexity of thought (Cassel, Cross, Ivanova, Jhangiani, Legkaia, & 
Suedfeld, 2008). According to Cassel et al.’s (2008) findings, complex thinkers are 
more likely to be perceived as “arrogant, egotistical, indecisive, vacillating, and 
uncommitted” (p. 2). Less complex thinkers are more likely to be viewed as 
“simplistic, closed-minded, stubborn, and unwilling to devote enough time, thought, 
and information search before making a decision” (p.2, Cassel et al., 2008). 
 Integrative complexity has additionally been studied from a cross-cultural 
psychological perspective (Tadmor et al., 2009). According to this perspective, 
integrative complexity reflects  
  the degree to which people accept the reasonableness of clashing  
  cultural perspectives on how to live and, consequently, the degree to  
  which they are motivated to develop cognitive schemas that integrate  
  these competing worldviews by explaining how different people can  
  come to such divergent conclusions or by specifying ways of blending  
  potentially discordant norms and values. (p. 106, Tadmor et al., 2009) 
 In a series of studies, Tadmor et al. (2009) investigated the relationship 
between integrative complexity and acculturation strategies (related to potentially 
assuming a new cultural identity). They compared complexity levels of  individuals 
who were classified as bicultural (those who simultaneously maintain their cultural 
heritage and adopt a new cultural identity), assimilated (those who have relinquished 
their cultural heritage and adopted a new culture, or separated (those who have 




biculturals were more integratively complex than the assimilated and separated 
individuals in domains related to culture (as well as in certain other domains). Based 
on their findings, they posited that bicultural individuals’ greater levels of complexity 
in the cultural domain were, “not merely because of their greater ability to 
differentiate between competing cultural perspectives but were also because of their 
greater ability to integrate them relative to assimilated or separated individuals” (p. 
130, Tadmor et al., 2009).  
 More recent evidence (e.g. Gruenfeld & Preston, 2000; Gruenfeld, 1995; 
Gruenfeld et al., 1998; Suedfeld & Granatstein, 1995) suggests that situational factors 
may be at least as important as, and perhaps even more influential than personality 
variables in determining levels of integrative complexity at any given time. Suedfeld 
(1988), posited that “good decision makers are those who have intuitive 
understanding of the level of complexity appropriate to the occasion” (p. 385-386, 
Suedfeld (1988), as cited in Myyry, 2002). Researchers have found that integrative 
complexity may be influenced by situational and environmental factors, including 
group status, stress, conflicting values, and pressures related to accountability 
(Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996; see Lee & Peterson, 1997; Tetlock et al., 1984; 
Gruenfeld, 1995; Gruenfeld et al., 1998).  
Tetlock et al. (1984) were among the first researchers to suggest that group 
status may influence levels of integrative complexity. They analyzed complexity of 
liberal, moderate, and conservative senators in five U.S. Congresses--three of which 
were dominated by liberals and moderates--and two of which were dominated by 




complex than conservatives in the Democrat-controlled Congresses, but when 
conservatives were in power, there were no differences in integrative complexity 
between groups. These findings provided early evidence that group status does, 
indeed, influence integrative complexity. Tetlock et al. (1985) found more evidence 
for a group status effect when analyzing Supreme Court opinions. Their results 
showed that written opinions of justices who had ruled with the majority showed 
greater integrative complexity than those who had ruled with the minority. 
More recently, Gruenfeld (1995) examined the influence of group status 
(majority vs. minority) as well as political ideology and unanimity of opinion within 
groups on levels of integrative complexity. She conducted an archival analysis of 
Supreme Court opinions, looking at integrative complexity of minority and majority 
opinions that were written in cases of nonunanimous decisions, as well as majority 
opinions written on behalf of unanimous vs. nonunanimous decisions, during eras 
where the court was liberally-dominated or conservatively-dominated. She found 
that for nonunanimous decisions, integrative complexity was lower for opinions 
authored by justices in the minority as opposed to those written by majority 
members, but contrary to Tetlock et al. (1984), she found that liberal and 
conservative justices did not differ in overall integrative complexity. She also found 
that unanimous opinions were less complex than nonunanimous opinions written by 
the majority.  
Gruenfeld concluded that group status is an important situational factor that 
influences levels of integrative complexity on policy reasoning, and that in contrast 




complexity. She posited that this finding might be attributed to differences in 
impression management strategies based on group status (in nonunanimous groups), 
because those in the majority are accountable to audiences for their decisions, and 
they might choose to present an opinion in a more complex way in order to portray a 
particular impression as to why they made a given decision when faced with two or 
more perspectives. However, she also suggested her findings could be attributed to 
changes in cognitive flexibility.  
According to Gruenfeld and colleagues’ (1998) cognitive flexibility 
hypothesis, individuals in the minority group may become more rigid and less 
flexible in their thinking as a result of being in the minority (possibly due to 
perceptions of the situation as threatening). Being in the minority inhibits one’s 
ability to consider alternative viewpoints, and should lead to convergent, black-and-
white thinking, as the minority is focused on their own view, and on defending it 
against the majority view. Majority members, on the other hand, are not constrained 
by this narrow, right-and-wrong thinking, and in fact, are open to considering and 
incorporating alternative viewpoints and displaying divergent thinking, which leads 
to greater creativity and flexibility in opinions and decisions. Their hypothesis posits 
that exposure to minorities’ arguments may produce open-mindedness amongst 
majority members, who are eager to make accurate decisions, but also reject 
minorities’ opinions (Gruenfeld et al., 1998).  
The cognitive flexibility hypothesis, which was based on Nemeth’s (1986) 
research on divergent thinking, suggests that majority members, attempting to 




effortful information processing (see Gruenfeld et al., 1998). As such, those in the 
majority, when exposed to a minority influence or viewpoint, may initially reject that 
viewpoint and begin searching for new alternative perspectives, strategies, and 
creative solutions to counter the minority viewpoint. This, in turn, may increase 
awareness of multiple perspectives, and thus, may lead to an increase in integrative 
complexity. Those in the minority, on the other hand, may show more convergent 
thinking, only focusing in on their position against the majority’s position, and as a 
result, they may display lower levels of integrative complexity, as they are not 
generating new perspectives or creative solutions in response to majority influence 
(Gruenfeld et al., 1998). Minorities’ “convergent” focus on their position versus the 
majority position “precludes consideration of any alternatives, as well as continued 
exploration of the issue” (p. 206), and as a result, they are less likely to differentiate 
as well as integrate different perspectives (Gruenfeld et al., 1998). 
This theory was also developed, in part, on Moscovici’s (1980) conversion 
theory, which proposes that majority members experience a particular tension 
between themselves and minority members who dissent, and they resolve the conflict 
by trying to consider and validate the minority position, but then also consider 
innovative or creative ways to counter that position, which leads to original thinking 
and a better understanding of new dimensions of the issue. One consequence for 
majority members, however, is that it leaves them more susceptible to the minority 
position than they previously were, which could lead them to privately embrace the 




Gruenfeld et al. (1998) further investigated the influence of group status as 
well as the additional situational variables of social context (private vs. public 
opinion) and unanimity of group (unanimous vs. nonunanimous) on integrative 
complexity. They found more direct evidence that majority and minority group 
members show differences in complexity levels as a function of group status.  In 
their experiment, participants read about a Supreme Court decision on a social policy 
and then were asked to write about whether they agreed or disagreed and to explain 
their rationale and feelings about the decision in a private statement. Afterward, they 
were placed in discussion groups where they were either in the majority or minority 
(or unanimous groups), and were informed that the majority position would be the 
final decision of the group. After the group decision, participants were asked to 
either write an opinion that expressed their private thoughts and feelings about the 
decision, or to imagine that their opinion would be a matter of public record. They 
found that after the group discussion, those in the majority showed an increase in 
complexity while those in the minority (and those in unanimous groups) showed a 
decrease, regardless of the social context in which the opinions were written. 
Gruenfeld et al. (1998) concluded that their findings supported their cognitive 
flexibility hypothesis, which posits that group conflict stimulates majority members’ 
divergent thinking processes. According to their hypothesis, majority members 
should be motivated to consider alternative viewpoints and then refute them, and in 
the process, develop creative solutions to problems (Gruenfeld et al., 1998), Minority 
members, on the other hand, should demonstrate more convergent and narrow 




on their main position versus the majority position. This model suggests that 
minorities are either not motivated to consider other viewpoints or new ideas, or are 
less able to think creatively and present innovative solutions.  
 In early research, integrative complexity was assessed by administering a 
Paragraph Completion Test (PCT), whereby participants completed sentence stems, 
such as “When I am confused…” (Lee & Peterson, 1997; Schroder, Driver, & 
Streufert, 1967; see also Suedfeld, 1992).  Responses were then coded on the 7-point 
complexity scale (as utilized in the content analysis measure), assessing the two 
structural dimensions of differentiation and integration. This test was problematic in 
that it could not assess situational changes in integrative complexity, and it lacked 
external validity (Koo, Han, & Kim, 2002; Tetlock et al., 1994; see also Lee & 
Peterson, 1997). Methodological changes were later made to the PCT coding 
procedures that allowed complexity to be assessed using archival documents as well 
as other written and verbal statements (Koo, Han, & Kim, 2002).   
 Suedfeld and Rank (1976) began to assess complexity in written and verbal 
statements, and were able to attain high levels of test-retest reliability and inter-rater 
reliability. This new, flexible approach to measuring complexity allowed for 
increased external validity (as “real world” written statements and speeches could be 
analyzed), and it also allowed researchers to investigate situational variables that may 
impact complexity (Koo et al., 2002). The updated content analysis approach has 
been used in both lab and archival research studies to assess individual difference 
correlates as well as situational factors that impact levels of integrative complexity. 




“reasonable construct validity” (e.g. Baker-Brown, Ballard, Bluck, de Vries, 
Suedfeld, & Tetlock 1992, as cited in Tadmor et al., 2009; Tetlock et al.,1996,  as 
cited in Tadmor et al., 2009).  
 Tetlock et al. (1993) also assessed complexity using Picture Story Exercises, 
whereby participants were presented with ambiguous pictures and asked to write 
descriptions about them. The written statements were then coded for integrative 
complexity. However, the content analysis approach appears to be the most popular 
method of assessing integrative complexity, and the majority of research related to 
integrative complexity has utilized this approach to analyze archival data (Lee & 
Peterson, 1997). 
Considering complexity from a broader viewpoint, Van Hiel and Mervielde 
(2003) investigated the associations between several different measures of “cognitive 
complexity” in a series of studies designed to assess the relationship between 
complexity and political extremism. In their first (2003) study, they used two 
measures of complexity—a political prediction measure (Sidanius, 1988), as well as 
the content analysis measure of integrative complexity (taken from Schroder et al., 
1967; see Tetlock, 1984). They found that the content analysis measure showed a 
positive relationship between extremism and level of complexity; however, the 
political prediction test revealed a negative relationship; furthermore, the two 
complexity scales showed virtually no correlation, suggesting a lack of construct 
validity.  
Based on the lack of association found between the two measures, Van Hiel 




study.  This study utilized the two measures of complexity from their first study, as 
well as the Einstellung problems developed by Luchins (1942), and Bieri’s (1955, 
1966) and Scott’s (1962) cognitive complexity tests (see Van Hiel & Mervielde, 
2003). The authors noted that the combination of these measures represented five 
decades of complexity theory in psychology.  
The Einstellung problems are a set of mathematical problems that can be 
solved with the use of a long solution, which utilizes a fixed series of steps that 
supposedly lead to automatic processing and application of the long solution (see Van 
Hiel & Mervielde, 2003). After the solution has become automatic, an extinction 
problem is given which cannot be solved with the long method, but rather, must be 
solved with a short and direct solution. Those individuals who are high in rigidity and 
low in cognitive complexity should be more persistent in trying to apply the long 
method, while those low in rigidity or high in cognitive complexity should apply the 
short method in less time (see Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003).  
Bieri’s test (1955, 1966) was created from a person perception perspective and 
was used frequently in the 1960’s (see Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003). In this test, 
participants assign a number from –2 to 2 on various constructs of a variety of objects 
(which include people). Those high in complexity are expected to show more 
diversification in scoring along the different dimensions (see Van Hiel & Mervielde, 
2003). 
Scott’s (1962) measure involves an object-sorting task whereby participants 
must place 28 countries into meaningful categories that have political relevance (see 




complexity is determined by the “dispersion of these countries over the set of 
distinctions yielded by the category system” (p. 790, Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003).  
Results of this study revealed only weak correlations among scores on the 
different measures. An important conclusion they were able to draw was that the 
various complexity measures did not appear to be related to one another. Van Hiel 
and Mervielde (2003) found no support that any of the complexity tests were 
measuring the same construct. In fact, low correlations among cognitive complexity 
tests have been repeatedly found (Fransella & Bannister, 1977; see Van Hiel & 
Mervielde, 2003).  
Van Hiel and Mervielde (2003) did highlight some potential problems with 
regard to the of the measures that were used. They noted, for example, that Fransella 
and Bannister (1997)  critiqued Bieri’s test as a differentiation measure, but not an 
integration measure. One explanation they consider is that Bieri’s test, which grew 
out of person perception research, may focus more on differentiating people along 
personality dimensions. Van Hiel and Mervielde have also posited that the 
differentiation of more categories on Scott’s test leads to greater complexity scores 
(see Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003). They suggested, as well, that the content analysis 
measure of integrative complexity might be “primarily understood in terms of 
differentiation” (p. 798), because Tetlock’s content analysis measure frequently 
results in lower scores (scores of 3 or less). As such, integration is not often assessed.  
Van Hiel and Mervielde (2003) sought to determine whether different 
measurements of complexity were measuring the same dimension, and they found 




been put forth by researchers to establish “stable, replicable cognitive style 
dimensions” (p. 797). They further noted that because most studies use a single 
measure, there has not been much integration of findings in the voluminous body of 
cognitive complexity research.  
The content analysis measure of integratively complexity was chosen for these 
experiments. As highlighted by Antonio & Hakuta (2003), a strong advantage of 
using this measure is that it is: 
 an established social science measurement tool and has been used in a  
 wide body of literature as an outcome and it has a substantial body of  
 supporting empirical research, published in some of the best peer- 
 reviewed journals in the field of social and personality psychology. (p.  
 1) 
Furthermore, as Suedfeld and Granatstein (1995) pointed out, with regard to 
the content analysis measure,  “schemata imposed upon the source material by these 
methods are relatively standardized in application, resistant to artifacts such as 
experimenter bias, and rigorous in interpretation” (p. 510). The content analysis 
measure of integrative complexity covers both dimensions of differentiation and 
integration (as opposed to only one or the other), and it has been shown to be reliable, 
and to have construct validity as well as external validity. As a result, it was selected 
as the measure of complexity for the present set of experiments.  
Cognitive Appraisal 
Gruenfeld and colleagues (Gruenfeld et al., 1998; Gruenfeld, 1995) have 




differences in complexity. It is also possible that cognitive appraisals (such as threat 
and challenge appraisals), as a function of a group status, may influence ability to 
think complexly about social issues. Cognitive appraisal has not previously been 
suggested as a potential mediator or moderator to explain group status differences in 
levels of complexity, and has not specifically been linked to integrative complexity 
research. 
  The general concept of threat has been studied extensively in a variety of 
domains in psychological research. Threat has been linked to a wide array of negative 
variables as well as negative outcomes. Threat, in the psychology literature, has 
traditionally been defined as a perception of “potential harm or loss” (Lazarus and 
Folkman, 1984), and Janis (1982) similarly described threat as a fear of failure or 
defeat, which may also lower self-esteem. Threat perceptions have additionally been 
identified as sources of stress (Suedfeld, de Vries, Bluck, Wallbaum, & Schmidt, 
1996; Suedfeld & Granatstein, 1995). Furthermore, Denson, Spanovic, and Miller 
(2009) described psychological stressors as “threats to psychological well-being“ (p. 
824). (See also Kemeny, 2003; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  
Threat has been studied extensively as a type of cognitive appraisal as well 
(as opposed to a challenge appraisal), which is also associated with negative 
outcomes (Tomaka et al., 1993; Tomaka et al., 1997; Skinner & Brewer, 2002). In 
the literature on antecedents of emotion, appraisal styles have been described as 
“dispositions to appraise ongoing relationships with the environment consistently in 
one way or another” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 138). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) identified 




appraisals. They posited that while harm/loss appraisals occur after stressful 
situations are over, threat and challenge appraisals occur before stressful situations 
(in anticipation of them). Threatened people, then, should perceive a potential for 
loss, with nothing or little to gain, while challenged people, should perceive the 
possibility of gain (Tomaka et al., 1993).  Skinner and Brewer (2002) further 
posited that specific events could be appraised in terms of threats or challenges to 
one’s values, well-being, and commitments. They identified threat appraisals as 
being harmful, potentially dangerous, and interfering with concentration, while 
claiming that challenge appraisals are beneficial and encourage effort and 
motivation. Skinner and Brewer (2002) also linked threat to the anticipation of 
failure or negative evaluations, and challenge to positive variables including a focus 
on opportunities for success, social rewards, learning, and personal growth.  
According to Skinner and Brewer (2002), when interpreting an event as a 
challenge, individuals are more likely to believe that stressful situations or problems 
can be overcome. Challenge appraisals, therefore, are also related to an increased 
interest in the situation or event and a perceived need for greater effort to be put 
forth, and are positively associated with attributions of self-responsibility or personal 
control (Skinner & Brewer, 2002). 
Blascovich and Mendes (2000) and Blascovich and Tomaka (1996) have 
presented a biopsychosocial model that predicts cognitive responses based upon 
challenge versus threat appraisals. According to this model, individuals must 
evaluate, both consciously and unconsciously, available resources and demands on 




characterized by negative affect and an “inadequate or disorganized mobilization of 
physiological resources” (p. 63), and suggest a threat appraisal occurs in a goal-
relevant situation, when situational demands exceed resources and coping abilities. 
They also linked threat responses with strong negative affect. Furthermore, Tomaka 
et al. (1993) stated that “threatened” individuals should be more likely to perceive a 
potential for loss, while “challenged” individuals are more likely to focus on 
potential gains.  
According to Tomaka and colleagues (1997), a challenge response is 
associated with positive affect and a greater ability to organize and utilize 
physiological resources. Challenged individuals should, therefore, be more energized 
and eager to perform well, while threatened people should exhibit decreased ability 
to perform well on a goal-relevant task. Vick, Seery, Blascovich, and Weisbuch 
(2008) further posited that within the biopsychosocial model, challenge and threat 
represent, “anchors of a unidimensional bipolar motivational state” (p. 625), whereby 
“challenge/threat results from relative evaluations of situational demands and 
personal resources, influenced by both cognitive and affective processes, in 
motivated performance situations” (p. 625). 
In their research, Tomaka and colleagues (Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994; 
Tomaka et al., 1993) have explored both antecedents and consequences of threat 
versus challenge states during “motivated performance situations,” which include 
situations that require cognitive responses and instrumental problem solving 
(Tomaka et al., 1997). Examples of motivated performance situations include 




competitive task performance (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 
2001).  
In earlier studies (e.g. Tomaka et al., 1993), threat and challenge states were 
determined post hoc, based on participants’ appraisals of demands and ability to cope 
on an anticipated performance task. However, Tomaka et al. (1997) were also able to 
induce threat and challenge appraisals in later studies; they successfully elicited 
threat and challenge appraisals in an experimental setting. Tomaka et al. (1997) had 
participants read one of two sets of instructions before performing a mental 
arithmetic task. One set emphasized accuracy and speed of performance and 
potential evaluation, while the other set emphasized putting forth effort, thinking of 
the task as a challenge, and doing one’s best to meet the challenge. The first set of 
instructions was designed to produce a threat appraisal, while the second set was 
designed to produce a challenge appraisal.  They assessed cognitive appraisal by 
measuring primary and secondary appraisal perceptions.  
The primary appraisal involved asking participants how threatening they 
expected the task to be, while the secondary appraisal involved asking how well 
participants were able to cope with the task. The ratio of primary to secondary 
appraisal was meant to reflect the extent to which demands exceeded ability or 
resources to cope. Physiological responses (e.g. heart rate, cardiac activity, vascular 
resistance) were also assessed, and were consistent with threat and challenge 
appraisal scores.  Hence, their findings were the first to support the proposition that 





In further support of this idea, Weisbuch-Remington, Mendes, Seery, and 
Blascovich (2005) found that cognitive appraisals could be primed by subliminally 
presenting threatening pictures of religious symbols to Christian participants (vs. 
non-Christian participants), but the effect was only found for Christian participants, 
and only when they were performing a task related to existential issues. 
As discussed, the influence of threat and challenge appraisals on 
performance, as they relate to group and intergroup interactions, has been examined 
in a limited context, but there is still much that remains unknown about the 
relationship between group status and cognitive appraisals, and how different 
appraisals may impact levels of integrative complexity. The proposed experiments 
predict that cognitive appraisal (whether one perceives a situation in terms of a threat 
versus a challenge) will mediate the previously found group status effect (Gruenfeld 
et al., 1998), and that threat appraisals will be linked to lower levels of complexity, 
as compared to challenge appraisals. Experiment 2 also predicts that a cognitive 
appraisal prime will moderate the effect of group status on integrative complexity.  
Anxiety and Coping Expectancy 
In addition to predicting that intergroup interactions may result in an increase 
in perceived demands (related to danger, uncertainty, or required effort), cognitive 
appraisal researchers have also suggested that intergroup interactions may result in 
increased anxiety, which may independently or jointly (with cognitive appraisal) 
influence performance (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Lickel, 2000; Stephan & 




Previous research has, indeed, shown that anxiety and threat are often 
positively linked (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991). Skinner and Brewer 
(2002) examined the role of cognitive appraisal (both trait and state appraisals), 
emotion (including anxiety as a negative emotion), and coping expectancy prior to 
completing achievement and performance tasks in stressful situations. Their 
assessment of negative emotion focused on anxiety as the “prototypical negative 
achievement-related emotion” and their assessment of positive emotion emphasized 
eagerness and excitement in anticipation of a reward or benefit (Skinner & Brewer, 
2002, p. 678). 
Skinner and Brewer (2002) found that state threat appraisals were positively 
associated with increased negative emotion (i.e. anxiety) and trait threat appraisals, 
and negatively associated with coping expectancy. State threat appraisals were also 
associated with harmful perceptions regarding state appraisals and emotion. Skinner 
and Brewer (2002) also found that state challenge appraisals were associated with 
increased levels of coping expectancy and positive emotion (i.e. excitement), as well 
as with trait challenge appraisals.  
Recent research, however, has also shown that increased anxiety is not 
always associated with perceptions of potential harm or threat (Skinner and Brewer, 
2002; Carver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1988). Researchers have found that when 
individuals perceive that they will be able to cope with demands in stressful 
situations, they may perceive increased anxiety as beneficial, and it may even 
improve performance on various tasks (Jones & Hanton, 1996; Swain & Jones, 




1989), found that when coping expectancies were adequate, mild levels of anxiety 
could actually motivate individuals to prepare and perform better on a test, whereas 
those who did not have adequate coping expectancies were negatively impacted by 
anxiety. 
Coping expectancy, or the perceived ability to cope with a situation, has also 
been proposed as a mediating variable that may impact integrative complexity. 
Folkman and colleagues proposed a theory of stress and coping that identified 
cognitive appraisal and coping as two processes that mediated “stressful person-
environment relations” and their outcomes (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, 
DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) defined coping as an 
individual’s “constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage 
specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding 
the person's resources” (p. 993, as cited in Folkman et al., 1986).  
Suedfeld (1992) also proposed a model related to stress and coping, which 
predicted a nonlinear relationship between environmental stressors and information 
processing, particularly focusing on how decision-makers address problems they are 
facing. This cognitive manager model suggested that decision-makers (e.g. leader of 
a country) would “allocate cognitive resources in accordance with cost-benefit 
considerations” (p. 511, Suedfeld & Granatstein, 1995).  This model further 
suggested that decision-makers, consciously or nonconsciously, would: 
 devote time, energy, care, information-gathering resources, decision  
 aids, and so on, to the extent that a problem seems worth such an  




 to produce an optimal solution (p. 511, Suedfeld & Granatstein, 1995). 
Because complex information-processing is more effortful and costly, this 
model predicts that heuristic processing will be used when a cost-benefit analysis 
concludes that resources would be better used in another situation or to solve a 
different, concurrent, problem (Suedfeld, 1992; See Suedfeld & Granatstein, 1995). 
 Additional research by Suedfeld and others has also shown that stress and 
coping abilities may specifically influence levels of integrative complexity (Suedfeld 
& Granatstein, 1995; Suedfeld et al., 1986; Suedfeld et al., 1993; Schroder et al., 
1967). Schroder and colleagues (1967), for example, found that environmental 
stressors led to lower levels of integrative complexity. They concluded that stressors 
can serve as a form of cognitive load inhibiting one’s ability to think complexly. 
However, they also found evidence that varying levels of stress can impact 
complexity in different ways. Based on these findings, Suedfeld & Granatstein 
(1995) posited that stress and integrative complexity have a curvilinear relationship, 
such that very high and very low levels of stress are associated with low complexity. 
They proposed the disruptive stress hypothesis, whereby complexity levels would 
increase with stress levels up to an “optimum level of arousal.” Beyond that level, 
however, increased stress levels would lead to decreased complexity. Thus, “if the 
challenge is too severe, too persistent, occurs simultaneously with too many other 
demands, or if cognitive resources are depleted through fatigue, illness, fear, or other 
adversities, complexity decreases” (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 2001,      p. 294).  
They further proposed that when situational demands overwhelm one’s 




outcome, they become less complex in their thinking. Guttieri, Wallace, & Suedfeld 
(1995) found support for this idea when they looked at the speeches and writing of 
leaders in the U.S. during the Cuban missile crisis, and observed a decrease in 
complexity as the situation progressed. They posited that the stress of trying to reach 
a solution under time pressure may have led to decreased levels of complexity.   
Suedfeld at al. (1993) also found that during the first Persian Gulf war (1990-
1991), pro-Iraq leaders showed significant declines in complexity as the UN deadline 
for withdrawal from Kuwait approached, and also as the war began. Alternatively, 
leaders who supported the invasion of Iraq demonstrated increased complexity at this 
time.  
Suedfeld et al. (1986) found additional evidence to support the disruptive 
stress effect in a content analysis study of Robert E. Lee’s writings (including letters, 
dispatches, and orders) and the writings of opposing generals during six major battles 
of the Civil War. Lee showed significantly greater integrative complexity than 
opposing generals during battles that he eventually won, and lower or more 
comparable levels of complexity during battles that he went on to lose. Furthermore, 
Lee showed a cumulative decrease in complexity in 1863-1864 as resources began to 
dwindle and the likelihood of defeat became more certain (Suedfeld et al., 1986).  
Also, according to the disruptive stress hypothesis, high levels of stress or 
elevated stress levels over a prolonged period of time may lead to decreases in 
complexity regardless of resource allocation analyses. Suedfeld & Granatstein 




officer during World War II, and found that he showed lower levels of complexity 
during the war, but that complexity increased when wartime stress was eliminated.  
Furthermore, they found a slight increase in his complexity after a personal 
indiscretion was brought to light and as he was promoted in terms of rank. He also 
showed a decrease in complexity when he was in a Corps command position that he 
did not like, and showed the lowest level of complexity when he received strong 
criticism and a negative evaluation from superiors. This was a stressful time for the 
commander as his unit had experienced confusion and suffered heavy casualties in a 
recent battle under his command. When his unit had a successful attack, he showed 
an increase again.  
Lastly, when he was removed from his command position and moved to an 
administrative position, he showed an increase in complexity. This is likely because 
he was relieved to be removed from a stressful position, and was moved to a position 
that was a better fit for his personality (Suedfeld & Granatstein, 1995). This study 
provided additional evidence that complexity can increase in times of mild stress, 
when coping expectancies are higher, but decrease when stress becomes more 
intense and ability to cope is reduced. Furthermore, when stressors are removed, 
complexity may increase again.  
Coping expectancy has also been closely linked to state and trait cognitive 
appraisals as well as anxiety in past research. For example, Blascovich and 
colleagues found that challenge appraisals were associated with higher coping 
expectancies, as well as with decreased levels of stress and greater perceptions of 




1996; Tomaka et al., 1993; Tomaka et al., 1997).  Furthermore, doubts concerning 
“one’s ability to cope with demands of stressful situations” have also been linked to 
threat appraisals (p. 679, Skinner & Brewer, 2002; Bandura, 1997; Beck, Emery, & 
Greenberg, 1985), and “poor coping expectancies relative to managing situational 
demands” have been linked to greater levels of anxiety (p. 679, Skinner & Brewer, 
2002; Bandura, 1997; Morris et al., 1981). Skinner and Brewer (2002) also found 
that higher and lower coping expectancies were associated with increased excitement 
and increased anxiety, respectively (Skinner & Brewer, 2002).  
The role of coping expectancy as a mediator of the relationship between 
group status and complexity was assessed in the present experiments. It was 
hypothesized that minorities, in anticipation of a group discussion on a controversial 
social issue, would exhibit reduced coping expectancy and increased anxiety (which 
has been found to decrease ability to process information). Reduced coping 
expectancy and higher anxiety levels, in turn, were expected to inhibit minorities’ 
ability to think complexly and consider the issue at hand more thoroughly. As a 
result, minority members were expected to demonstrate lower levels of complexity 
when writing their opinion statements even before a group discussion took place. 
Majorities, on the other hand, in anticipation of a group decision being made, were 
expected to exhibit greater coping expectancy and less anxiety than minorities, and 
as a result, would be more able to focus on different aspects of the issue. 
Consequently, majority members were expected to develop more complex opinions 




It was also predicted that anxiety would be positively associated with a threat 
appraisal response and negatively associated with a challenge appraisal response, as 
Skinner and Brewer (2002) found. Additionally, it was predicted that high coping 
expectancy would be associated with challenge appraisals, while low coping 
expectancy would be positively linked to threat appraisals, which would also support 
Skinner and Brewer’s (2002) past findings.  
It was possible that cognitive appraisal, in conjunction with, or rather than 
anxiety or coping expectancy, would be a mediator of integrative complexity. It was 
also possible that coping expectancy would be a mediator of complexity, in 
conjunction with, or rather than cognitive appraisal or anxiety. It was additionally 
plausible that anxiety, in conjunction with, or rather than cognitive appraisal or 
coping expectancy, would be a mediator of complexity.  
It was certainly plausible that minorities, because they have less power in a 
group and little or no control over outcomes, might perceive group conflicts as more 
threatening, and make threat appraisals rather than challenge appraisals. A threat 
appraisal may negatively impact one’s ability to think complexly about an issue.  
Because a threat appraisal is associated with a focus on potential losses rather than 
gains, it may, alternatively, decrease motivation to consider different viewpoints or 
aspects of an issue. Furthermore, because threat has been linked to increased anxiety 
and identified as a stressor (Skinner & Brewer, 2002; Suedfeld et al., 1996), threat 
appraisals and/or high anxiety levels may tax cognitive resources and reduce coping 
expectancies, inhibiting an individual’s ability to think complexly about an issue. 




and low coping expectancies would lead to decreased ability (and motivation) to 
think complexly about a challenging social issue. 
Predictions 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to test the hypothesis that in a group discussion 
setting, majority (versus minority) members would exhibit lower levels of anxiety 
and higher levels of coping expectancy in anticipation of a group discussion on a 
social issue, as they perceive the issue and discussion in terms of a challenge, which 
should lead them to be eager and able to think more broadly about alternative 
perspectives when considering the issue. Majority group members were expected, 
therefore, to exhibit greater complexity in their written opinion statements. Minority 
members, on the other hand, were expected to show higher anxiety levels and lower 
levels of coping expectancy in anticipation of a group discussion, as they perceived 
the issue and discussion as a threat (as opposed to a challenge), which would 
decrease the ability and motivation to process arguments and think complexly about 
the issue. They were expected, therefore, to exhibit less complexity.  
For majority members, the situational demands were not expected to 
outweigh personal, psychological resources; for minority members, situational 
demands, including increased anxiety, were expected to exceed mental resources, 
thereby limiting ability to think complexly about the issue. In this design, 
participants in all conditions were motivated to perceive the social issue and 
discussion as serious and important, in order to strengthen appraisals of threat and 





Based on the evidence regarding the impact of cognitive appraisals, as well as 
the influence of anxiety and coping expectancy on task performance, it seemed 
possible that under some circumstances, both majority and minority members would 
perceive demands as exceeding resources, while in other situations, they might 
perceive the opposite (thus, exhibiting a threat response in some instances and a 
challenge response in others). 
Experiment 2 was designed to demonstrate that when threat (versus 
challenge) perceptions were primed, participants would adopt an appraisal consistent 
with the prime, regardless of their group status. When challenge was primed, 
individuals were expected to make a challenge appraisal, whereas when threat was 
primed, participants were expected to make a threat appraisal. Because type of 
appraisal was already being induced, it was predicted that individuals of both 
majority and minority groups would not perceive a need to look to other information 
to try and identify the situation as threatening or challenging. In other words, they 
were expected to recognize the prime of threat or challenge and respond accordingly, 
rather than evaluating the overall situation and making a threat or challenge appraisal 
on their own.  
Those in the threat prime conditions were expected to show lower levels of 
complexity in their written opinion statements, while those in the challenge prime 
conditions were expected to show greater levels of complexity. Those in the control 
conditions were expected to show complexity levels consistent with Experiment 1; in 




show less complexity than those in the majority. Minority members in the control 
condition were expected to show complexity levels consistent with those in the two 
threat prime conditions, while majority members in the control condition were 
expected to show complexity levels consistent with those in the two challenge prime 
conditions.  
Anxiety levels were expected to be higher in the threat prime conditions, and 
lower in the challenge prime conditions. Additionally, coping expectancies were 
expected to be lower in the threat prime conditions, and higher in the challenge 
prime conditions. Minorities in the control condition (similar to those in the two 
threat prime conditions) were also expected to report higher anxiety and threat 
appraisal levels, and lower coping expectancy and challenge appraisal levels. 
Majority members in the control condition (similar to those in the two challenge 
prime conditions) were expected to report lower anxiety and threat appraisal levels, 
and higher coping expectancy and challenge appraisal levels, which would, in turn, 






Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
 
The main goal of the first experiment was to test the hypothesis that group 
status impacts levels of integrative complexity in anticipation of a group discussion. 
The second goal was to test whether cognitive appraisal (whether the arguments are 
perceived in terms of a challenge vs. a threat), anxiety, and coping expectancy 
mediated the relationship between group status and integrative complexity. In this 
experiment, I manipulated group status (majority vs. minority), and assessed 
cognitive appraisal, anxiety, and coping expectancy as mediating variables on levels 
of integrative complexity.  
The experimental design used for both Experiments 1 and 2 was based on 
Gruenfeld et al.’ (1998) studies, and similar procedures were followed; however, one 
major change was that integrative complexity was assessed for opinions written just 
prior to a group discussion, as opposed to afterward (see Gruenfeld et al., 1998). This 
was done because complexity scores were expected to be immediately impacted by 
the proposed mediating variables (as opposed to being changed in response to an 
actual interaction with a minority influence), and this removed the possibility that 
minority influence as a result of group interaction would also differentially impact 
complexity.  
Cognitive appraisal was assessed after participants read an article about a 
controversial social issue and had been informed of their group status (whether they 
were in the majority or minority based on their opinion of the issue). Anxiety and 




Participants were then asked to complete an opinion assessment immediately 
before they were to ostensibly participate in a group discussion. Statements were 
later coded for integrative complexity. Two coders independently coded each written 
statement, and inter-rater reliability was assessed. In order to qualify, coders trained 
for several weeks using the detailed manual by Baker-Brown and colleagues (Baker-
Brown et al., 1992). Five samples of fifteen to twenty sample statements were given 
to coders, and they had to achieve an acceptable level of inter-rater reliability (r=.80) 
in order to continue. Individuals’ complexity scores represented the dependent 
measure. Mediation analyses were also conducted to assess whether cognitive 
appraisal, anxiety, and coping expectancy mediated the relationship between group 
status and complexity.  
Method 
Participants 
 76 participants completed the experiment. Participants were recruited via 
email and through a web-based, voluntary registration system. Participants received 
extra credit in their psychology courses in exchange for participation. Four 
participants were dropped from the analyses (two participants could not recall their 
group status, one participant’s written statement was unscorable, and another 
participant reported during the suspicion check that he/she did not believe there 
would be a group discussion and believed that the group status assignment was made 






Integrative Complexity.     Integrative complexity was assessed using a content 
analysis approach that has been used in several archival studies to study complexity 
of speeches (Tetlock, 1983), interview transcripts (Tetlock, 1984), personal letters 
(Suedfeld & Bluck, 1993), written opinion statements (Gruenfeld et al., 1998), and 
transcripts of verbal, face-to-face, political negotiations (Liht, Suedfeld, & Krawczyk, 
2005). This content analysis measure of integrative complexity has been shown to be 
a reliable measure of cognitive style, and has been used successfully to measure 
situational changes in complexity levels (Tetlock, 1983, 1986; Gruenfeld, 1995; 
Gruenfeld et al., 1998).  
In this experiment, participants’ written opinion statements were coded for 
integrative complexity (see Appendices A and B). Scorers followed coding procedures 
developed by Schroder et al., (1967) and expanded by Tetlock (1983; 1986), as 
described in the manual by Baker-Brown et al. (1992). This measure assesses two 
cognitive style variables: evaluative differentiation and conceptual integration. 
Differentiation refers to ability and willingness to tolerate conflicting interpretations, 
while integration refers to development of connections among differentiated 
cognitions. Assessment is on a seven-point scale where a score of 1 signifies low 
levels of both differentiation and conceptual integration, a score of 3 signifies 
moderate or possibly high differentiation but absence of integration, a score of 5 
indicates moderate or high differentiation and moderate integration, and a score of 7 




are transitional levels in the scales of the two structures (see Appendix B for general 
explanations of scores and sample statements).  
  Cognitive Appraisal.     Skinner and Brewer’s state cognitive appraisal scale 
was used to assess threat and challenge appraisals (see Appendix C). The scale 
consisted of 4 threat-related items and 4 challenge-related items. Participants were 
asked to indicate on a scale of 1-6 the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 
each of the 8 statements. They were also asked to rate the frequency of their thoughts 
about each statement on a scale of 1-6 (from hardly ever occurring to occurring almost 
constantly). These two scales were highly correlated, and the final measure was an 
additive combination of these two scales (see Skinner & Brewer, 2002). 
  Anxiety.     Anxiety was assessed using Corenblum and Stephan’s (2001) 12-
item intergroup anxiety measure (see Appendix D). Participants were asked to 
indicate on a 7-point Likert scale the extent to which they were experiencing various 
anxiety-related feelings.  
  Coping Expectancy.     Coping expectancy was assessed using a three-item 
self-report  measure, based on Skinner and Brewer’s (2002) measure (see 
Appendix C). All items were assessed on a 6-point scale. The first two items were 
identical to those used by Skinner and Brewer, and assessed individuals’ confidence 
with regard to their ability to cope with the demands of the situation (1=very confident 
can cope effectively, 6=very concerned whether can cope effectively), and to avoid 
failure (1=little confidence in ability to avoid failure, 6=strong confidence in ability to 
avoid failure). The third item was altered slightly to fit the current design, such that 




and Brewer’s scale assessed). The third item specifically assessed participants’ 
confidence in their ability to achieve a desired goal (1=little confidence in ability to 
achieve desired goal, 6=strong confidence in ability to achieve desired goal).  
Procedure 
 Participants were told that the experimenters were working with the school 
newspaper to research students’ opinions on social issues (see Appendix E for 
script). They were told that they would be working in small groups to discuss a 
social issue, and that the group would be asked to write an opinion at the end of the 
discussion. They were led to believe that the group opinions, as well as individual 
opinions, might be published in the school newspaper as part of a joint project with 
the journalism department, and might influence other students (although no names or 
personal information would be released).  This deception was used to increase the 
likelihood that the participants would take the task seriously.   
 Participants arrived at the lab one or two at a time, where two confederates 
were waiting and posing as participants. Therefore, each participant perceived that 
there were at least two additional participants present. The participants were led to 
lab rooms where they were asked to read and sign an informed consent form, and 
complete a one-item social issues questionnaire (to indicate whether they were more 
in favor or against same-sex marriage).  
 Next, participants were asked to read an article about the selected issue (see 
Appendix F). Participants read an article about a fictitious court case that the New 
York Supreme Court had ostensibly recently ruled on, which would set a precedent 




debated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Participants were asked to indicate whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the court decision. The court’s opinion was varied such that 
half of participants read about a decision that favored legalizing same-sex marriage, 
whereas the other half read about a decision that opposed legalizing same-sex 
marriage.  This was done to assess the possibility that participants’ opinions on the 
issue may have been confounded with the opinion expressed in the article. An effort 
was made to counterbalance the number of groups where the majority was for or 
against the court decision. 
 After reading the assigned article, participants were told they would soon be 
placed into small groups to discuss and form a group opinion on the issue.  They 
were then asked to complete four questionnaires. These were the cognitive appraisal, 
anxiety, and coping expectancy measures, as well as a more detailed opinion 
assessment, which would be used to assess integrative complexity.  The participants 
were also informed of whether their opinion, at that time, was the majority or 
minority view within the group to which they were assigned. This was done by 
telling those in the minority, “it looks like nobody in the group agrees with you; you 
are the only one who took this position” and telling those in the majority, “it looks 
like everyone in the group agrees with you except for one person; everyone else 
shares your opinion.” Participants were also reminded that their statements could be 
published in the school newspaper.  
 A manipulation check was then administered. Participants were asked to 
indicate what they were told about the status of their position in the group discussion. 




(the majority condition), “you are in the minority/no one in the group agrees with 
you” (the minority condition), or “was told nothing/do not recall”. Participants also 
completed a suspicion check that assessed whether they were suspicious about the 
purpose of the experiment, and if so, to indicate what they believed it was really 
about. Finally, they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. 
Two trained coders then independently rated each of the opinions written by 
participants. Coders were unaware of the experimental conditions under which 
opinions were written. To qualify, they trained for several weeks using the detailed 
manual by Baker-Brown et al. (1992), and completed all practice materials and tests 
found on an online complexity workshop  (see Electronic complexity downloads 
page, 2005). Coders were required to continue training until they reached an 
acceptable level of inter-rater reliability on practice sets of coded statements (r=.80). 
Results 
 Reliability analyses were conducted for the cognitive appraisal scale (for both 
threat and challenge appraisals) and for anxiety and coping expectancy scales. One 
item was dropped from the coping expectancy scale; all scales were found to be 
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Inter-rater reliability was also assessed on the content analysis measure of 
complexity. Reliability between the two coders ‘ scores was r=. 85, p<. 01. 
 A 2 (group status: minority vs. majority) x 2 (social issue; for same-sex 
marriage vs. against same-sex marriage) x 2 (article type: supports “traditional” 
marriage vs. supports same-sex marriage) ANOVA was conducted to assess the 
effect of group status on integrative complexity as well as the effects of the potential 
confounding variables on complexity. A main effect of status was found, F(1, 
64)=9.04, p<.01.  Those in the minority expressed more complex opinions than those 
in the majority (M=2.04, SD=1.32 vs. M=1.32, SD=.74). An unexpected main effect 
for article type was also observed, F(1,64)=5.85, p=.02. Participants who read an 
article that supported ‘traditional” marriage showed more complexity than those who 
read an article that supported same-sex marriage (M=1.83, SD=1.29 vs. M=1.43, 
SD=.83). However, no main effect for social issue was observed, F(1,64)=.71, p>.05. 




complexity from those who were opposed (M =1.61, SD=1.01 vs. M =1.53, 
SD=1.25).  
  An interaction between status and article type was also observed, F(1, 
 64)=6.29, p=.02. When participants in the minority read an article that supported 
 upholding the “traditional” definition of marriage, they showed more complexity than 
 those in the other conditions (see Table 2).  
Table 2 
Experiment 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Group Status x Article Type on 
Integrative Complexity 
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 Mediational tests were conducted to examine whether cognitive appraisal, 
anxiety, and coping expectancy mediated the relationship between status and 
complexity. Using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) test, status, complexity, and each of the 
potential mediating variables were entered into regression analyses to test for 
mediation. Each proposed mediator was tested individually. According to this model, 
the status manipulation should significantly predict the dependent measure of 
cognitive complexity, and status should also predict each of the proposed mediators. 
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status, in order to find at least partial mediation. Status was found to be a significant 




























Figure 4. Experiment 1: Path diagram for challenge appraisal as mediator of group 























b=.16, p>.05 b=.17, p>.05 



























Figure 6. Experiment 1: Path diagram for coping expectancy as mediator of group 
status on complexity. 
 
 However, status did not predict threat appraisal (see Figure 3); minority 
members did not report higher scores on the threat appraisal measure than majority 
members (M=2.78, SD=1.02 vs. M=2.56, SD=1.15), F(1, 69) =.67, p>.05. Status also 
did not predict challenge appraisal (see Figure 4); minority members did not report 
significantly lower scores than majority members on the challenge appraisal measure 
(M=3.27, SD=1.03 vs. M=3.15, SD=1.10), F(1, 69) =.22, p>.05. Additionally, status 
was not a predictor of anxiety (see Figure 5), F(1, 69) =1.72, p>.05; Minority 
members did not report higher anxiety levels than majority members (M=2.91, 






















predictor of the final proposed mediator, coping expectancy (see Figure 6), F(1, 69) 
=3.67, p=.06; Minority members (M=4.37, SD=1.22) reported marginally lower levels 
of coping expectancy than majority members (M=4.86, SD=.94).  Coping expectancy, 
while controlling for status, however, did not predict complexity (see Figure 6).   
 As a set, threat appraisal, challenge appraisal, anxiety, and coping expectancy 
significantly predicted integrative complexity, R=.41, p=.01. Controlling for the other 
proposed mediators, threat appraisal, challenge appraisal, and anxiety each 
significantly predicted complexity (b’s=-.46, .28, .41, p<.05). Controlling for threat 
appraisal, challenge appraisal, and anxiety, coping expectancy did not predict 
complexity (b=-.25, p>.05). 
 These analyses demonstrated that cognitive appraisal, anxiety, and coping 
expectancy did not mediate the relationship between status and complexity. Status 
did, however, marginally predict coping expectancy, and coping expectancy predicted 
complexity.  
Using the Sobel test for mediation, none of the proposed mediators (threat, 
challenge, anxiety, and coping expectancy) significantly mediated the relationship 
between status and complexity (z’s=02, .11,  .81, and 1.11, p>.05, respectively). 
Correlational analyses were also conducted to assess the relationships among 
the predicted mediating variables. As anticipated, coping expectancy was negatively 
related to threat and anxiety, and threat and anxiety were positively correlated (see 
Table 3).  However, threat and challenge were also positively correlated, which was 
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A main effect for group status was found, revealing that minority members 
expressed more complex opinions than majority members. This finding was contrary 
to the hypothesis that majority members would show greater complexity than 
minority members. Also, an unexpected main effect for article type was observed, 
whereby those who read an article supporting “traditional” marriage showed greater 
complexity than those who read an article that supported changing the “traditional” 
definition of marriage to allow for same-sex marriages. The observed interaction 
between group status and article type was also not expected, but it revealed that those 
in the minority who read an article favoring “traditional” marriage showed greater 
complexity than those in all of the other conditions. With regard to mediational 




expectancy) were found to be significant mediators of the relationship between group 
status and integrative complexity. 
Discussion 
The observed main effect of status in Experiment 1 revealed that individuals 
in the minority expressed greater levels of complexity than those in the majority, 
which was contrary to predictions. Some past research, though, has shown that 
moderate amounts of stress or anxiety may increase complexity (Suedfeld & 
Granatstein, 1995; Suedfeld et al., 1986; Suedfeld et al., 1993). In this experiment, 
anxiety and threat were strongly correlated (r = .66), and it is possible that, although 
they were not found to be significant mediators of group status and complexity, 
perceptions of threat and higher anxiety levels contributed to increases in complexity 
of thinking in some (perhaps less direct) way. Controlling for the other proposed 
mediators, anxiety and challenge appraisal positively predicted complexity, which 
does suggest that some anxiety may be associated with more complex thinking. Also, 
threat appraisal, controlling for the other variables, negatively predicted complexity, 
which also suggests that cognitive appraisal may be associated with changes in 
complexity, at least in some situations.  
Furthermore, as Skinner and Brewer (2002) discussed, it may be possible to 
perceive a situation as both challenging and threatening at the same time, thereby 
eliciting a threat appraisal as well as a challenge appraisal. In the second experiment, 
threat and challenge appraisal variables were combined to form a dual-appraisal 
variable (threat appraisal x challenge appraisal), and this dual-appraisal variable was 




Additionally, an unexpected interaction was observed, such that those in the 
minority who read an article favoring “traditional” marriage showed greater 
complexity than all of the other conditions. One possibility, with regard to this 
finding, was that most of the sample was in favor of same-sex marriage, and thus, 
likely opposed the article favoring “traditional” marriage. Reading an article about a 
court case where the majority of judges supported traditional marriage may have 
made participants feel as though they were in the minority, which could have served 
as a moderate stressor, possibly motivating them to think more complexly. Those in 
the minority group status condition, then, might have perceived the situation as even 
more stressful (but not exceeding the threshold at which stress negatively impacts 
complexity), which may have motivated them to think even more complexly than 
those in the other conditions. In order to control for this possibility, all participants in 
Experiment 2 read an article that was in opposition to their personal view. For 
example, participants who indicated they opposed same-sex marriage were always 
given the article about a court case that ruled in favor of same-sex marriage. As a 
result, the potential for article type to be a confounding variable was reduced.  
In Experiment 2, cognitive appraisal (threat/challenge) was primed, in order 
to assess whether it moderated the relationship between group status and complexity. 
It was expected that priming threat/challenge would lead to changes in complexity of 
thought. Experiment 2 also examined whether cognitive appraisal, anxiety, and 
coping expectancy mediated the interaction between group status and appraisal 
(threat/challenge) prime on complexity. It also assessed whether the proposed 




complexity, as well as group status and complexity. One possibility was that 
minorities and majority members in the threat prime condition would show greater 
levels of anxiety and threat appraisal, and reduced levels of coping expectancy and 
challenge appraisal, while those in the challenge prime conditions would show 
decreased anxiety and threat appraisal levels, and greater levels of coping expectancy 
and challenge appraisal.  
Alternative Hypotheses 
 The predictions made for the present set of experiments support past findings 
with regard to group status effects on complexity (Gruenfeld et al., 1998). However, 
based on the results of Experiment 1, an alternative set of predictions could also be 
made for Experiment 2. According to the disruptive stress hypothesis, if minority 
members, overall, experienced mild increases in anxiety, they could show more 
complexity than majority members. Furthermore, if minority members perceived 
increased threat levels, this could also lead to increased complexity, particularly if 
they were confident in their ability to cope with demands of the situation. In fact, the 
threat prime could serve to strengthen perceptions of threat and increase anxiety 
further, which could lead to an even greater increase in complexity as opposed to 
those in the other conditions, as long as the stress “threshold” was not surpassed. On 
the other hand, minorities in the threat condition could experience levels of threat 
and anxiety that might go beyond the moderate increases that have been associated 
with increased complexity, thus leading to decreased complexity when compared to 




Additionally, based on the disruptive stress hypothesis, it was possible that a 
main effect for the threat/challenge prime could be observed, such that the threat 
prime could lead to moderately increased perceptions of threat and anxiety levels, 
and as a result, those in the threat conditions could demonstrate more complex 
thinking than those in the challenge conditions.  
Furthermore, it was possible that minorities might perceive the situation as 
more threatening, but due to the moderate increases in stress, they might also feel 
more motivated and challenged to try and influence or persuade majority members to 
change their opinions, particularly in the challenge condition. Therefore, it was 
possible that minorities in the challenge prime condition could report higher levels of 
threat and challenge appraisal simultaneously, which could lead to even greater 
motivation to think complexly. In fact, there is some prior evidence that both threat 
and challenge appraisal styles can be present at the same time (See Skinner & 
Brewer, 2002). As Skinner and Brewer (2002) suggested, it may be possible to 
perceive a situation as both challenging and threatening, thereby eliciting both a 
threat and challenge appraisal. As a result, minorities in the challenge prime 
condition could demonstrate greater complexity than majority members in the 
challenge prime condition. Majority members in the challenge prime condition, on 
the other hand, could perceive the situation a stressful, and therefore would not be 
motivated to think complexly about the issue. In Experiment 2, the threat appraisal 
and challenge appraisal variables were combined (see Skinner & Brewer, 2002) to 




variable was also examined as a possible mediator of complexity (in addition to the 
individual threat and challenge appraisal variables). 
Another possibility, based on the results of Experiment 1, was that minority 
members in the threat prime condition might report even greater levels of threat and 
anxiety (and lower levels of coping expectancy and challenge) than majority 
members in the threat prime condition. In Experiment 1, majority members did 
report higher levels of coping expectancy than minority members (4.86 vs. 4.29), and 
coping has been previously associated with challenge appraisals, and negatively 
associated with threat appraisals and anxiety. These findings were in line with the 
disruptive stress hypothesis discussed earlier in this paper. In Experiment 1, coping 
expectancy negatively predicted complexity, and this effect could again be observed 
in Experiment 2.  In fact, minorities who were primed with threat could show the 
lowest levels of coping expectancy, and the greatest levels of anxiety and threat, 
which may lead to the most complex thinking (assuming the “stress threshold” is not 
surpassed).  
An additional possible outcome was that minorities who were primed with 
challenge could show greater levels of challenge and threat appraisals, thereby 
making a dual appraisal based on the situation. The perceived stress of being in the 
minority, in conjunction with the challenge appraisal, could serve to motivate the 
minorities to think more complexly than majority members in the challenge 
condition. Majority members in the challenge prime condition may perceive little 




feel very able to cope with the situation and lack motivation to think more 
complexly. 
A final possibility that was considered was that minority members in the 
threat prime condition could show lower levels of complexity than majority members 
in the threat condition. Again, based on the disruptive stress hypothesis, it was 
possible that minorities who were primed with threat would report greater levels of 
anxiety and threat appraisal (and lower levels of coping expectancy and challenge) 
than those in the majority who were primed threat. Minorities primed with threat 
could potentially experience increased anxiety and threat to the point that it exceeds 
that optimal threshold and decreases complexity rather than increasing it. Similarly, 
they could report lower levels of coping expectancy, such that reduced coping 
expectancy hinders motivation or ability to think complexly about the issue.  For the 
same reasons, minority members in the threat prime condition could show lower 
levels of complexity than minorities in the control and challenge prime conditions. 
Also, based on the disruptive stress hypothesis, majority members in the threat prime 
condition could show greater complexity than those in the challenge prime and 
control conditions. The threat prime could moderately increase perceptions of threat 
and anxiety levels, and decrease coping ability to a point where it would increase 
motivation to think more complexly. This would be consistent with the finding in 
Experiment 1 that coping expectancy negatively predicts integrative complexity.   
 The results of Experiment 1 may also be interpreted in relation to the body of 
research on power (e.g. Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Galinksy, Magee, 




“an individual’s relative capacity to modify others’ states by providing or withholding 
resources or administering punishments (p. 265). Galinsky et al. (2008) further 
defined power as “asymmetric control over valuable resources and outcomes within a 
specific situation and set of social relations” (p. 1451), whereby those with power 
may have control over others as well as independence from others in obtaining certain 
outcomes (Galinsky et al. 2008; ; see also Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; 
Keltner et al., 2003).  Furthermore, Galinsky et al. (2008) surmised that, by this 
definition, power, could also be described as “the capacity to be uninfluenced by 
others” (p. 1451).  
  Keltner et al. (2003) did distinguish power from related constructs such as 
status, which they defined as the “outcome of an evaluation of attributes that produces 
differences in respect and prominence” (p. 266), and they noted that it is possible to 
have power without status (and vice versa).  However, they also pointed out that 
status, at least in part, determines how resources are distributed within groups, and as 
such, it can be a determinant of individuals’ power (Keltner et al., 2003).  
 Based on a broad range of past research findings, Keltner et al. (2003) proposed 
a model of power that focused on approach and inhibition related tendencies in 
relation to social context. Their model posited that increased power involves, 
“reward-rich environments and freedom and, as a consequence, triggers approach-
related positive affect, attention to rewards, automatic cognition, and disinhibited 
behavior” (p. 265).  They proposed that reduced power, on the other hand, is 
associated with “increased threat, punishment, and social constraint and thereby 




situationally constrained behavior” (p. 265).  Their model was partially based on 
research regarding behavioral approach and inhibition, and was influenced by 
Higgins’s (1997, 1999) theory of self-regulatory focus.  
 Higgins’ theory focused on the social processes by which people may obtain 
rewards and avoid threats (i.e. whether they focus on promotion versus prevention). 
Higgins and colleagues (e.g. Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; Shah & Higgins, 
2001) have proposed that:  
  a promotion focus, triggered by nurturance needs, associations regarding  
  the ideal self, and potential gains, activates cheerful (or dejected) affect  
  (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; Shah & Higgins, 2001), approach- 
  related behavior, and the heightened sensitivity to positive outcomes  
  (Brendl, Higgins, & Lemm, 1995). (p. 268) A prevention focus, triggered  
  by security needs, associations regarding the ought self, and potential  
  punishment, activates agitated affect, avoidant behavior, and the  
  sensitivity to negative outcomes (p. 268).  
 As Keltner et al. (2003) discussed, previous research has demonstrated that 
rewards and opportunities can trigger approach-related processes that help individuals 
pursue and obtain related goals, while inhibition-related processes are activated by 
punishment, threat, and uncertainty. Keltner et al.’s (2003) model specifically 
predicted that high power is associated with positive affect, attention to rewards, 
automatic information processing, and disinhibited behavior. Low power, according 
to their model, is associated with negative affect, attention to threat and punishment, 




goals. Low power should also be associated with controlled information processing 
and inhibited social behavior.  
 Research conducted by Fiske (1993) and Neuberg and Fiske (1987) provided 
early evidence that high-power individuals are more likely to use automatic 
processing to interpret social events, possibly because they are less motivated to 
attend to the consequences of their actions, also because individuals in more powerful 
positions tend to have more cognitive demands placed on them (see Keltner et al., 
1998; Fiske, 1993; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). Additionally, power has been linked to 
positive affect, and positive affect is associated with more automatic information 
processing (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994, cited in Keltner et al., 2003); 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000, as cited in Keltner et al., 2003). Lower power, conversely, 
has been associated with depressed mood and anxiety, which can lead to more 
controlled, effortful information processing (see Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001; see Keltner et al., 2003). Furthermore, past research has shown that 
minority groups who are stereotypically associated with reduced power (e.g. Asians 
and African Americans) have reported increased anxiety relative to European 
Americans (e.g., Sasao, Toshiaki, Duval, & Sadamura, 1986, as cited in Keltner et al., 
2003; Warren, 1997, as cited in Keltner et al., 2003). 
 Based on their proposed model, Keltner et al. (2003) hypothesized that 
individuals who are low in power should show greater levels of integrative 
complexity in comparison those who are high in power. This could possibly occur 
because those low in power may experience increased concern about the 




high levels of complexity (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, as cited in Keltner et al., 2003); 
see also Tetlock, 1992). The results of Experiment 1 may be interpreted from a 
similar perspective. It could be that minority status, similar to low power (as status is 
related to power). leads greater complexity of thought. Additionally, minority 
members, like those low in power, may perceive increased perceptions of threat and 
anxiety (as well as coping expectancy), and these variables may mediate the 
relationship between status and complexity. Predictions based on this model may be 
similar to those suggested by the disruptive stress hypothesis, although it does not 
necessarily predict the curvilinear relationship (whereby increased stress, beyond a 
certain threshold, leads to a reduction in complexity) that the disruptive stress 




Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
 
 A primary goal of Experiment 2 was to manipulate cognitive 
(threat/challenge) appraisal through a priming procedure, to determine the impact of 
a perceived threat versus a perceived challenge on levels of complexity. It was 
posited that majority members may be more likely to perceive a conflict in terms of a 
challenge appraisal, but minority members may be more likely to perceive a conflict 
in terms of a threat appraisal. Although status did not predict cognitive appraisal in 
Experiment 1, it did predict coping expectancy, and coping expectancy has been 
linked to cognitive appraisal in a wide range of studies (Skinner & Brewer, 2002; 
Tomaka et al., 1997).  Coping expectancy was also correlated with threat appraisal in 
Experiment 1. 
 Priming threat or challenge could change the interpretation of the situation, 
and the group status differences observed in Experiment 1 could be enhanced or 
reduced, accordingly. Threat/challenge prime was manipulated by having participants 
read a set of instructions before reading an article about a court decision on an 
important social issue.  
 Similar to Tomaka et al.’s (1997) manipulation of appraisal, participants read 
one of two sets of instructions. One set emphasized accuracy, performance and 
potential evaluation, and mentioned that some students had previously found the 
group discussion task to be threatening and intimidating, while the other set 
emphasized putting forth effort, thinking of the group discussion task as a challenge, 
and doing one’s best to meet the challenge. These latter instructions also mentioned 




inspirational. The first set of instructions was designed to produce a threat appraisal 
and response, while the second set was expected to produce a challenge appraisal and 
response.  
 In the threat prime condition, participants were told: 
  We want you to be aware that some students have found the group 
   discussion task to be threatening. It’s also been described as  
  intimidating. Many seem to worry about the fact that their   
  performance within the group will be evaluated, and that the quality of  
  their arguments will be assessed. Keeping this in mind, we ask that  
  you express your opinion on the issue, and be sure that any facts you  
  state are accurate. 
 In the challenge prime condition, participants were told: 
  We want you to be aware that some students have found the group  
  discussion task to be challenging. It’s also been described as  
  inspirational. We’d like you to think of this task as a challenge, and to  
  think of yourself as someone who is capable of meeting that challenge.  
  Keeping this in mind, we ask that you express your opinion on the  
  issue, and put forth your best effort.  
 A control condition was also included, which was expected to replicate 
Gruenfeld et al.’s (1998) findings that majority members showed greater levels of 
complexity than minorities. Alternatively, it could replicate the results of Experiment 




 This experiment was a 2 (group status: majority vs. minority) x 3 (appraisal 
prime: threat prime vs. challenge prime vs. no prime) design with integrative 
complexity as the dependent measure. Opinion statements were independently coded 
by two individuals to determine levels of complexity. Coding procedures were 
followed exactly as described in Experiment 1.  
Method 
Participants 
93 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Maryland 
participated in this experiment. They were recruited via email and through a web-
based, voluntary registration system. Participants received extra credit in their 
psychology courses in exchange for participation. Four participants were dropped 
from the analyses because they did not recall their group status (majority vs. 
minority) during the manipulation check. Two more participants were dropped for 
not recalling which set of instructions they were given (i.e. the “challenge prime” 
instructions vs. the “threat prime” instructions) during the manipulation check.  Five 
additional participants were then dropped from the analyses for indicating, during the 
suspicion check, that they did not believe their group status position was real, and/or 
they did not believe a group discussion was really going to take place. All five also 
correctly identified a significant portion of the hypotheses, and therefore were 





 The opinion assessment that was used in Experiment 1 to assess integrative 
complexity was used in this experiment as well. Opinion assessments were coded for 
integrative complexity using content analysis coding procedures (See Baker-Brown et 
al., 1992; Schroder et al., 1967; Tetlock, 1983; 1986). An original, multiple-choice 
survey measure of integrative complexity (Appendix F) was also used in the 
experiment, but was dropped from the final analyses due to a lack of construct 
validity between the two measures. The cognitive appraisal, anxiety, and coping 
expectancy measures that were used in the first experiment were also administered in 
this experiment. 
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 closely followed the procedure for Experiment 1. 
One significant change was that some participants were given instructions that were 
designed to prime threat, some were given instructions to prime challenge, and some 
were given no accompanying instructions. This third condition served as the control 
condition. A second change in Experiment 2 was that participants were always given 
an article that disagreed with their position on the social issue, whereas in the 
previous experiment, this type of article had been varied. This change was made to 
eliminate type of article as a potentially confounding variable. A third change was 
that participants were asked to complete an additional, multiple-choice measure of 
integrative complexity after completing their opinion assessments.  
 Manipulation checks were administered at the end of the experiment. 




discussion, that their opinion was in the majority/minority. Participants also 
indicated whether they were told “everyone in the group agrees with you” (the 
majority condition) or “no one in the group agrees with you” (the minority 
condition). Additionally, as a manipulation check for the appraisal prime variable, 
participants were asked to indicate whether the instructions they had been given 
emphasized accuracy and performance, and mentioned threat, or whether they 
emphasized putting forth effort and doing their best, and mentioned challenge. 
Results 
 Reliability analyses were conducted on the scales for the proposed mediating 
variables to assess internal consistency. The anxiety scale and the threat and 
challenge appraisal scales were found to be reliable (see Table 4).  
Table 4 
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Threat appraisal 
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.86 0 .86 
Coping expectancy 
 
.77 1 (#9) .82 
 
The coping scale was also shown to be reliable, although the first item was dropped 




Inter-rater reliability between the two coders on the content analysis measure 
of integrative complexity was also significant, r=.88, p<.01.  
 An additional multiple-choice measure of complexity (Appendix D) was 
originally included in this experiment. In order to assess construct validity, a 
correlational analysis was conducted to determine whether the content analysis 
measure of integrative complexity was associated with the new, multiple-choice 
measure. The new measure was a survey of seven statements, which varied in 
complexity according to the seven-point scale used in the content analysis measure. 
The statements were adapted from sample statements found in the complexity coding 
manual (see Appendix D). Participants were asked to check the statement that was 
most similar to their opinion.  
 Using the first coder’s data, the two integrative complexity measures were not 
significantly related, r=.10, p>.05. Looking at the second coder’s data, there was a 
small but significant correlation between the two measures, r=.30, p<.01. The 
content analysis measure of integrative complexity has been established as a valid 
measure, and has been shown to be reliable over time. Therefore, due to the lack of 
construct validity between the two measures, the survey measure was dropped, and 
the content analysis scores were used for subsequent analyses.  
 A 2 (status: majority vs. minority) x 3 (prime: threat vs. challenge vs. control) 
x 2 (social issue: for vs. against same-sex marriage) ANOVA was conducted to 
determine whether social issue was a potential confounding variable. There was no 
main effect for social issue (F(1, 63)=.11, p>.05), and social issue did not interact 




issue was eliminated as a potential confound, and the proposed 2 (status: majority vs. 
minority) x 3 (cognitive appraisal prime: threat vs. challenge vs. control) ANOVA 
was conducted, using the content analysis measure of integrative complexity as the 
main dependent variable.  
The 2 (status: majority v. minority) x 3 (prime: threat v. challenge v. control) 
ANOVA produced a main effect for status, F(1, 68)=22.02, p<.001.  Consistent with 
the results of Experiment 1, minority members showed greater complexity than 
majority members (M=2.19, SD=1.23 vs. M=1.33, SD=.72). A marginally significant 
main effect was also found for prime, F(2, 68)=2.59, p=.08. Participants in the threat 
condition expressed higher levels of complexity than those in the challenge and 
control conditions (M= 1.88, SD=1.20 vs. M’s=1.61, SD=1.04 and 1.68, SD=1.02, 
respectively). 
 A significant interaction between status and appraisal prime was also found, 
F(2, 68)=4.24, p=.02. Minority members who received the threat prime showed the 
most complexity, whereas majority members in the threat and control conditions 
were the least complex (see Table 5). Across the majority conditions, there were no 
differences between the challenge, threat and control groups. Looking at the minority 
conditions, significant differences were found across type of prime, F (2, 68) =5.07, 
p<.01. For minorities, those in the threat group showed more complexity than those 





Experiment 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Prime Type x Group Status on 
Integrative Complexity 
 Group Status 
 Majority Minority 













1.44 .90 2.00 1.11 
 
Across the threat conditions, a significant difference was observed between majority 
and minority members, F=(1, 68)=19.53, p<.001. Minority members showed more 
complexity than majority members within the threat conditions (see Table 5). In the 
control conditions, there was a marginally significant difference between majority 
and minority groups, F(1, 68) =3.61, p=.06, and majority members showed less 
complexity than minority members (see Table 5). No significant differences were 
found among the three challenge conditions, however.  
 Analyses were also conducted to determine whether the proposed mediating 
variables mediated the interaction between group status and cognitive appraisal 
prime on complexity. Using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) test, the interaction term 
(group status x cognitive appraisal prime) was not significant, F(2, 69)=2.30, p>.05, 
and did not predict complexity, b=-.16, p>.05. Therefore, further mediational 




Appraisal prime did not predict complexity (r=-.05, p>.05) either, so no 
further mediational analyses were conducted. Further analyses were carried out to 
assess whether or not cognitive appraisal, anxiety, or coping expectancy mediated 
the relationship between status and integrative complexity. Using Baron and Kenny’s 
test for mediation, group status was found to predict integrative complexity, r=.42, 
p<.01. Status also positively predicted anxiety and threat, and negatively predicted 
coping expectancy, but did not significantly predict challenge (see Table 6; see 




b=.35, p<.05 b=-.09, p>.05 
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b=.27, p<.05 b=-.18, p>.05 














Figure 8. Experiment 2: Path diagram for challenge appraisal as mediator of group 





























Figure 10. Experiment 2: Path diagram for coping expectancy as mediator of group 
































b=.33, p<.05 b=-.04, p>.05 















Figure 11. Experiment 2: Path diagram for threat-challenge dual appraisal as 
mediator of group status on complexity. 
 
Looking at the proposed mediators (anxiety, threat, challenge, coping 
expectancy, and threat-challenge), none of them predicted complexity while 
controlling for status (see Figures 7-11).   
 Group status predicted threat appraisal, F(1, 81) =11.11, p<.001; minority 
members (M=2.75, SD=1.09) reported higher levels of threat appraisals than majority 
members (M=2.03, SD=.86).  Status did not predict challenge appraisal, however, 
F(1, 81) =.72, p>.05. Majority members did not report higher levels of challenge 
appraisal (M=3.13, SD=1.09 vs. M=3.34, SD=1.09). Status was a predictor of anxiety, 
F(1, 81) =6.67, p=.01; minority members reported higher levels of anxiety than 
majority members (M=2.87, SD=.85 vs. M=2.42, SD=.74). Status was also a predictor 
of coping expectancy, F(1, 81) =15.60, p<.001; Majority members reported higher 
levels of coping expectancy than minority members (M=5.01, SD=.88 vs. M=4.20, 













=9.68, p<.001. Minority members reported higher levels of dual threat-challenge 
appraisal (M=9.78, SD=6.01 vs. 6.49, SD=3.65).  
 The appraisal prime was not a predictor of threat appraisal, F(1, 78) =.32, 
p>.05. No differences were observed between the threat prime, challenge prime, and 
control conditions (M=2.49, SD=.94; M=2.23, SD=1.13; M=2.39, SD=1.03). The 
prime also did not predict challenge appraisal, F(1, 78) =.17, p>.05. Threat prime 
(M=3.40, SD=.94), challenge prime (M=3.30, SD=1.18), and control (M=3.22, 
SD=1.11) conditions did not differ in terms of levels of threat appraisal. Appraisal 
prime did not predict anxiety either, F(1, 78) =.74, p>.05. No differences were 
observed between the threat prime, challenge prime, and control conditions (M=2.67, 
SD=.83; M=2.42, SD=.76; M=2.68, SD=.89). Appraisal prime did not predict coping 
expectancy, F(1, 78) =.77, p>.05. No differences were observed between the threat 
prime, challenge prime, and control conditions (M=4.44, SD=.97; M=4.83, SD=1.00; 
M=4.54, SD=1.13).  Finally, appraisal prime did predict the dual threat-challenge 
appraisal, F(1, 78) =.19, p>.05. Threat prime, challenge prime, and control conditions 
did not differ on the dual appraisal variable (M=8.77, SD=4.55; M=8.09, SD=6.04; 
M=7.89, SD= 4.74).  
 As a set, the proposed mediators did not predict complexity, R=.18, p>.05, 
and none of the proposed mediators (threat appraisal, challenge appraisal, anxiety, 
coping expectancy, and dual threat-challenge appraisal) controlling for the others, 
predicted complexity (b’s=.15, .13, -.12, -.21, and -.09, p>.05, respectively).  
While status was a predictor of anxiety, threat appraisal, coping expectancy, 




relationship between status and complexity. Path analyses for anxiety, threat 
appraisal, challenge appraisal, coping expectancy, and threat-challenge dual 
appraisal are shown in Figures 7-11, respectively.  
Using the Sobel test for mediation, none of the proposed mediators (anxiety, 
threat, challenge, coping expectancy, or dual threat-challenge appraisal) mediated the 
relationship between status and complexity (z’s=.-1.23, -.78, .51, -.84, and -.47, 
p>.05, respectively). 
 Additional correlational analyses were run to assess the relationships between 
the predicted mediating variables. As predicted, coping expectancy was negatively 
related to threat and anxiety, but was not associated with challenge (see Table 6). 
Coping expectancy was also negatively correlated with the threat-challenge dual 
appraisal. Also, anxiety and threat were positively correlated, as well as anxiety and 
threat-challenge dual appraisal, but anxiety was not related to challenge appraisal 
alone (see Table 6). Threat and challenge were also found to be positively correlated, 
as they were in Experiment 1. All correlations are shown in Table 6.  
A status x prime interaction was expected, such that those in the challenge 
conditions, regardless of group status, would be more complex than those in the 
threat conditions, while in the control conditions, those in the majority (similar to 
those in the challenge conditions) would be more complex than those in the minority 
(who’s scores would be similar to those in the threat conditions). An interaction was 
found, but these predictions were not supported. In fact, minorities in the threat 
condition were more complex than majority members. Also, minority members in 




but a marginally significant effect illustrated that minority members in the control 
group showed greater complexity than majority members, which was consistent with 
the findings of Study 1.  
Furthermore, those in the challenge conditions were expected to show greater 
complexity than those in the threat conditions, but, in fact, for minorities, the 
opposite was observed. They were more complex in the threat condition than in the 
challenge condition. These findings are consistent with the alternative predictions 
that were previously discussed. Results of the mediational analyses revealed that 
neither cognitive appraisal (threat, challenge, as well as the dual threat-challenge), 
nor anxiety, nor coping expectancy significantly mediated the relationships between 
appraisal (threat/challenge) prime and integrative complexity group status and 
integrative complexity or group status and complexity. 
Discussion 
In Study 2, a significant interaction between group status and cognitive prime 
was observed, such that cognitive appraisal prime did moderate the relationship 
between group status and integrative complexity. This interaction did not support the 
original predictions, but it did support the alterative hypotheses that were also 
discussed earlier. Findings were in line with both the disruptive stress hypothesis, 
and Keltner et al.’s (2003) model of power and its relationship to approach and 







Chapter 4: General Discussion 
In Experiment 2, a significant interaction between group status and cognitive 
prime was observed, such that cognitive appraisal prime did moderate the 
relationship between group status and integrative complexity. This interaction did 
not support the original predictions, but it did support the alterative hypotheses that 
were also discussed. Threatened minorities showed greater complexity than those in 
the challenge prime and control conditions. This was the opposite of what was 
predicted. Furthermore, across control conditions, minorities showed more 
complexity than majority members. This, again, was the opposite of what was 
expected, but this finding was in line with the results of Experiment 1. When 
cognitive appraisal was not primed, minorities in both experiments demonstrated 
greater levels of complexity than majority members.  
Across majority conditions, no differences were observed between the threat, 
challenge, and control conditions. This finding was also not in line with original 
predictions, which posited that majority members in the threat condition would show 
less complexity than majority members in the other two conditions. It had been 
proposed that the threat prime would lead to reduced ability or motivation to think 
complexly, regardless of group status. This was expected based on the rationale that 
if appraisal is primed, then individuals might not perceive a need to make a 
particular, situational appraisal based on other factors, such as group status. 
However, this was not the case. Majority members were not affected by the appraisal 




believed they would be able to cope with the demands of the situation, were not 
motivated to think complexly about the issue. 
While these findings did not support the original hypotheses, they did provide 
some evidence of support for alternative hypotheses. According to the disruptive 
stress hypothesis (Suedfeld & Granatstein, 1995), moderate increases in stress may 
lead to increases in complexity of thought. This model proposed that moderate 
amounts of stress lead to more, complex thinking, as long as the stress does not 
become too great or exceed a certain threshold (see also Suedfeld & Tetlock, 2001; 
Guttieri et al., 1995; Suedfeld et al., 1993; Suedfeld et al., 1986). It is possible that 
minorities, based on group status, were more motivated to think complexly about an 
issue. Furthermore, minorities in the threat condition may have perceived even more 
stress, which might, again, have strengthened motivation to think complexly.  
Keltner et al.’s (2003) model, related to power, could also help explain the 
findings of these two experiments. Based on their model, they posited that 
individuals who are low in power may demonstrate greater levels of integrative 
complexity than those who are high in power. This effect may possibly due to 
increased concern (on the part of low-power individuals) about consequences of their 
actions, which has been linked to greater levels of complexity (see Keltner et al., 
2003). Similar to their predictions regarding those low in power, these experiments 
found that those with minority status (who may have been perceived as having low-
power) showed greater complexity than those in the majority (who may have been 
perceived as having high power). Majority members could have been perceived by 




told that the majority opinion was going to be the group’s final decision in the group 
discussion. Minorities, on the other hand, may have perceived themselves, or been 
perceived by the majority, as low in power, because their opinions were not likely to 
be incorporated into the group’s final decision. Further research is needed to assess 
which model provides a better explanation of these findings, and to assess, more in-
depthly, the specific impact that status has on integrative complexity. 
Mediational analyses were also conducted in both experiments, examining 
the potential mediating role of cognitive appraisal, anxiety, and coping expectancy 
on integrative complexity. None of the predicted mediators in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 mediated the relationship between status and complexity, nor did they 
mediate the relationship between appraisal prime and complexity in Experiment 2.  
They did not mediate the moderated interaction of group status and appraisal prime 
in Experiment 2 either. One possibility is that there are other mediating variables that 
were not identified and measured that do mediate the observed effects. Additionally, 
the proposed mediators could be indirectly influencing other mediating variables 
that, in turn, affect complexity. For example, status could predict coping expectancy, 
which could impact perceptions of control, which could increase or decrease 
complexity of thought.  It is also possible that a different measure of situational 
appraisal (see Tomaka et al., 1997) could be adapted to this design that might be a 
better fit based on the dependent measure. Many situational appraisal measures are 
based on and applicable to performance tasks, such a math test. It could be that they 




Additionally, group status only predicted coping expectancy in the first 
experiment, but predicted threat appraisal, anxiety, coping expectancy, and threat-
challenge appraisal in the second experiment. It is not clear why status was a 
stronger predictor of these variables in Experiment 2. One possibility could be that 
the experimenters and confederates were more familiar and comfortable with the 
script, and perhaps were more believable when discussing the cover story with 
participants. It is also possible that students in the second experiment took the 
experiment more seriously. Experiment 2 was conducted during a spring semester, 
and perhaps participants were older and more mature. Future studies could make 
improvements to the cover story used in these experiments in order to strengthen 
responses on the mediating measures, as well as to identify and assess other potential 
mediating variables. 
 There were some methodological issues with regard to these experiments that 
may have impacted results.  In the second experiment, the appraisal prime, which 
was adapted from Tomaka et al.’s (1997) study, did not predict threat or challenge 
appraisal (or threat-challenge appraisal). Therefore, it may be that the prime, in this 
instance, was not strong enough to have an impact on cognitive appraisal, or that this 
adaptation of the instructional sets was not seen as relevant to this particular task. 
Tomaka and colleagues (1997) had used varying sets of instructions to prime 
appraisal in order to assess performance on a task. In the present experiments, the 
task may have been perceived as more of a social influence task, and the instructions 
may not have sufficiently created or strengthened perceptions of threat versus 




prime did not effectively prime situational cognitive appraisals as it was expected to 
do. In future studies, a subliminal prime could prove to be more effective, or perhaps 
instructional sets that are geared more toward social influence or persuasion and less 
on task performance could replace the current sets of instructions. 
 Also in the second experiment, a second measure of integrative complexity 
was proposed. The second measure was a survey measure consisting of statements of 
varying complexity. Participants were asked to select the statement that most closely 
resembled their personal opinion.  Due to weak correlation between the two 
measures, this new measure was not used in the analyses. The content measure has 
been shown to be valid and reliable, and it assesses individuals’ personal statements 
and opinions. The survey measure, on the other hand, called for individuals to assess 
statements that somebody else had written, rather than formulate their own opinions. 
It could be that people may recognize or appreciate more or less complex statements 
when exposed to them, but may not be able or motivated to develop similar 
arguments on their own.   
 Additionally, Suedfeld et al. (1996) found that self-ratings of complexity were 
not as accurate as ratings of others’ complexity. Suedfeld et al. (1996) provided 
participants with information about coding for integrative complexity, and asked 
them to make assessments about their own complexity scores on a paragraph 
completion test, as well as make assessments of others’ complexity levels on the 
same task. Trained, expert coders also coded the statements, and their scores were 
compared to participants’ self-ratings and ratings of others. Suedfeld et al. (1996) 




many participants approached the level of a trained coder, and few even reached it), 
ratings of their own complexity did not correlate with trained coders’ scores.  
 Suedfeld et al. (1996) speculated that these observed differences in accuracy 
could be analogous to the fundamental attribution error (see Suedfeld et al., 1996), 
whereby differences in complexity between self-ratings and others-ratings may be 
attributed a greater availability of information about one’s own experiences. As such, 
information may be available to an individual, while thinking about a response, that 
may or may not be mentioned in their final opinion, and this could affect perceptions 
about one’s own complexity (Suedfeld et al., 1996). Consequently, the content 
analysis measure for assessing integrative complexity is likely the best and most 
appropriate measure to use when studying integrative complexity. 
 Another concern with regard to the procedure used in both of these 
experiments was that participants were sometimes run with another participant in the 
room, and sometimes run with a confederate in the room. As a result, it was difficult 
to counterbalance the conditions in terms of group status, and the cell sizes were 
uneven. This could be corrected in future studies by pairing the participants with a 
confederate every time, or running every participant in a room alone.  
 There were also methodological and design differences between these 
experiments versus Gruenfeld’s (1998) studies that may help account for the 
observed effects. Gruenfeld and colleagues found that in a similar group decision-
making context, majority members showed greater levels of complexity than 
minorities. In both of the present experiments, however, the opposite was observed. 




methodological concern was that these experiments did not have a baseline measure 
of complexity like Gruenfeld et al.’s (1998) did.  A baseline measure was planned, 
and an opinion assessment was placed in the psychology department’s mass 
screening packets (to be coded and provide a baseline measure), but not enough of 
them were completed to analyze changes in complexity.  
 In future research, it would be beneficial to obtain a baseline measure of 
complexity as well assess complexity levels after the experimental treatment. In fact, 
in Gruenfeld et al.’s (1998) studies, which found that majority members were more 
complex than minorities, integrative complexity was always assessed after a group 
discussion, in addition to being assessed prior to the discussion (and prior to 
experimental treatments), in order to establish a baseline.  
 There are several proposed explanations for Gruenfeld et al.’s (1998) findings. 
One possibility was that majority members were influenced by the minority to think 
more complexly, and a second potential explanation was that majority members were 
using a presentation strategy rather than expressing a true opinion; Gruenfeld et al.'s 
(1998) findings supported the first explanation regarding cognitive flexibility. In 
contrast to Gruenfeld et al.’s studies, the present experiments examined opinion 
statements written just before a group discussion took place, rather that after the 
discussion. This was done in order to assess whether cognitive appraisal, anxiety, 
and/or coping expectancy might mediate the effects of group status (and cognitive 
appraisal prime) on integrative complexity in anticipation of a group discussion.  
 Consequently, the findings of those experiments versus these experiments are 




than majority members after a discussion, but exhibit more complex thinking than 
majority members before a discussion. Consistent with the disruptive stress 
hypothesis, it could be that minorities experience an increase in stress before a group 
discussion, which motivates them, at that time, to think more complexity in an 
attempt to persuade or influence others. Following the group discussion, minority 
members may perceive a loss of control over the outcome, and consequently, may 
show less complex thinking, which would also be consistent with the disruptive 
stress hypothesis. A loss of control over perceived outcomes has been linked with 
reduced complexity (see Suedfeld & Granatstein, 1995; Suedfeld et al., 1993; 
Suedfeld & Tetlock, 2001).  
 More research needs to be done to further investigate the impact of status on 
complexity before and after stressful situations. For example, future studies could 
assess complexity immediately before and after a group discussion to test whether 
changes in complexity levels occurred. Furthermore, a different type of appraisal 
(e.g. harm/loss, or a secondary appraisal) could impact complexity levels, as opposed 
to the state threat and challenge appraisals considered in these experiments. Other 
types of appraisals could be studied in future research. 
 Another difference between the current designs and those used by Gruenfeld 
et al. (1998) was that these may have been perceived as more realistic. In the current 
experiments, the social issue that was used was current and contentious. The school 
newspaper cover story was included in these designs to make the issue and outcome 
seem more relevant and important. Gruenfeld’s issue (school busing policy) was 




quite as relevant to current issues. As Tetlock (1991, p. 453) wrote, “subjects in 
laboratory studies… rarely feel accountable to others for the positions they take. 
They function in a social vacuum.” These experiments were designed to increase 
perceptions of accountability to outsiders, and feel more “real world” in that sense. 
 Overall, these experiments demonstrated that, consistent with Gruenfeld et 
al.’s (1998) research, group status does impact integrative complexity. However, 
unlike Gruenfeld and colleagues, these experiments demonstrated that, at least in 
some instances, minority members appear to be more motivated (or able) to think 
complexly about controversial social issues. This contrasting finding suggests that 
further investigation is needed to determine under what circumstances minorities 
show increased versus decreased levels of integrative complexity. It is also important 
to further investigate the relationships between status, anxiety, cognitive appraisal, 
and coping, to more clearly identify the paths or conditions that may lead to greater 
or reduced complexity.  
 Furthermore, it would be beneficial to this area of research to identify and test 
other potential mediators that might mediate the relationship between status and 
complexity. Integrative complexity is a powerful variable that reflects how 
individuals think and structure their arguments. It may be used to influence and 
persuade others, as well as predict behavior. It is even possible that complexity 
exhibited by leaders or politicians could predict future conflicts (and perhaps even 
help to prevent them). Although social scientists have been studying this variable for 




however, appear to have great potential as an important and useful predictor of 
















We are investigating the psychological underpinnings of policy reasoning and 
decision-making, and we are interested in your thoughts and feelings on a social 
policy issue. Please answer the questions and write your opinion below. 
 
Please be honest and candid. 
 
Please rate how much you are for or against same-sex marriage on a scale of 1-7  
(Circle one): 
 
Very much for   1     2     3     4     5     6     7   Very much against 
 
Please rate how strongly you hold your opinion on same-sex marriage (Circle 
one): 
 
Not at all strongly   1     2     3     4     5     6     7   Very strongly 
 
Please rate how important this issue is to you (Circle one): 
 
Not at all important   1     2     3     4     5     6     7   Very important 
 
Please write, in the space provided, 2 paragraphs (or less) that express your opinion 
about the same-sex marriage and explain why you are for or against it. You may 



















General Explanations for Coding Scores and Four Examples of Coded Statements 
 
General Explanation for 1:  
  There is no sign of either conceptual differentiation or integration at  
  this scoring level.  The author relies, without qualification, on a  
  simple, one-dimensional rule for interpreting events or making choices  
  (p. 13, Baker-Brown et al., 1992). 
 
General Explanation for 2:  
  In a statement assigned a score of 1, the author ignores or rejects  
  alternative perspectives on an issue.  In a statement assigned a score of  
  2, the author recognizes the potential for looking at the same issue in  
  different ways or along different dimensions.  Differentiations are,  
  however, emergent rather than fully developed. The author may, for  
  example, qualify a normative rule or causal generalization, or display  
  an awareness of alternative futures.  The author may also discuss past  
  events in a way that suggests, but does not develop, new   
  interpretations. On the whole, this scale value represents a transition  
  level between the categorical structure of the score of 1 and the  
  differentiated structure of the score of 3 (p. 20, Baker-Brown et al.,  





General Explanation for 3 
  The crucial aspect of a score of 3 is the clear specification of at least  
  two distinct ways of dealing with the same information or stimulus.   
  The author recognizes that these different perspectives or dimensions  
  can be held in mind simultaneously.  The author may also specify  
  conditions under which these perspectives or dimensions are  
  applicable.  However, there is no evidence of conceptual integration.   
  Differentiation is the key element of a score of 3 (p. 23, Baker-Brown  
  et al., 1992). 
 
General Explanation for 4 
  At the earlier levels, the major element determining a specific score  
  was the presence or absence of differentiation.  In the score of 4, we  
  seek signs of the emergence of the second major scoring element,  
  integration.  That is, we begin to find indications of the ability to  
  integrate different and sometimes conflicting alternatives. Conceptual  
  integration is not clearly apparent at this level, however.  Instead, the  
  integration of alternatives is implicit. A score of 4 must show two  
  features.  First, there must be a clear representation of alternatives.  
  Second, there must be an implicit recognition of a dynamic  
  relationship between or among them.  The recognition of this  
  relationship signifies the emergence of integration, although at this  




  clear description of the relationship is often withheld until  
  further information is received. In summary, there is only a suggestion  
  that interaction exists between the alternatives; there is no overt  
  statement specifying the nature of this interaction (p. 28, Baker-Brown  
  et al., 1992). 
 
General Explanation for 5 
  A score of 5 indicates the explicit expression of integration.  The score  
  of 4 was the transition point between an expression solely defined by  
  differentiation and one where evidence of integration appears.   
  Whereas 4 signifies the emergence of integration expressed in a  
  tentative or uncertain manner, a score of 5 indicates that integration is  
  clearly evident.  Types of integration that emerge include mutual  
  influence, negotiation, causal attributions, and synthesis (p. 31, Baker- 
  Brown et al., 1992). 
 
General Explanation for 6 
  In general, the score of 6 involves a high-level interaction indicating  
  that the author is working with multiple levels of schemata.  The  
  alternatives at this level are dynamic:  they are expressed as plans,  
  processes, or courses of action made up of several moving parts, and  
  as such we may often refer to them as systems or networks.  One of the  




  “moving parts” within a system and also how those parts affect each  
  other or the system. At this level alternatives are readily accepted,  
  compared or contrasted, and integrated so as to present at least one  
  outcome.  Global overviews or organizational principles (temporal,  
  causal, ideological) are often presented. The emergence of this type of  
  principle is the second main indicator of the score of 6 (p. 35, Baker- 
  Brown et al., 1992). 
 
General Explanation for 7 
  The unique characteristic of a score of 7 is the presence of an  
  overarching principle or perspective pertaining to the nature (not  
  merely the existence) of the relationship or connectedness between  
  alternatives. In a score of 7, these alternatives are clearly delineated  
  and are described in reasonable detail. How each alternative may be  
  seen to be part of some overarching view, or how some overarching  
  view encompasses these alternatives, is made evident (p. 39, Baker- 
  Brown et al., 1992). 
 
General Explanation for unscorable 
  The main characteristic of an unscorable paragraph is that the author's  
  rule structure for drawing inferences or making decisions is not  





Examples of Scores 1, 3, 5, and 7 
Score of 1 indicates no evidence of differentiation or integration: 
I am for gay marriage because we are all born equal. Gay people are just as human as 
any straight person and deserve the same rights. 
 
Score of 3 indicates moderate or high differentiation, but no integration:  
I believe there should be a legal way for gay couples to get married.  They deserve the 
same recognition as heterosexual marriages.  But I can also see why the legalization 
of gay couples may be seen as a bad thing.  To some people legal gay marriage is 
seen as publicly embracing sinful behavior. 
 
Score of 5 indicates moderate or high differentiation and moderate integration:  
In my opinion the issue of gay marriage has developed from a variety of issues 
involving religion, civil rights, evolution, and philosophy of love.  Some see gay 
marriage as a sin, others see it as a civil right.  What needs to be discussed first is 
whether the concept of marriage should be based on religious ideology or solely on 
the concept of what a relationship is. 
 
Score of 7 indicates high differentiation and integration: 
My opinion on gay marriage is  that you might be in favor of it or opposed to it, based 
on whether you view it as a civil or religious issue.  Those who view it as a civil issue 
tend to be for it because they feel it is a right to marry who you want.  Those with a 
religious viewpoint tend to be against it because they believe homosexuality is a sin.  
There will continue to be a sharp division between these opposing forces until they 
both sit down and talk.  Only when they discuss their differences and reach a 







Cognitive Appraisal and Coping Expectancy Measures 
 
PART I (Cognitive Appraisal):  
 
1. I’m concerned that others will be disappointed with how I express my 
opinion. 
 
Strongly Disagree     1    2    3    4    5    6    Strongly Agree 
 
 This thought hardly   1   2    3    4    5    6   This thought occurred  
    ever occurred              almost constantly 
 
2. I am looking forward to testing my knowledge, skills, and ability in the 
 discussion group. 
 
Strongly Disagree     1    2    3    4    5    6    Strongly Agree 
 
 This thought hardly   1   2    3    4    5    6   This thought occurred  
    ever occurred              almost constantly 
 
3. I worry that I may not be able to achieve the goal I am aiming for. 
 
Strongly Disagree     1    2    3    4    5    6    Strongly Agree 
 
 This thought hardly   1   2    3    4    5    6   This thought occurred  
    ever occurred              almost constantly 
 
4. I am looking forward to the rewards of successfully debating this issue. 
 
Strongly Disagree     1    2    3    4    5    6    Strongly Agree 
 
 This thought hardly   1   2    3    4    5    6   This thought occurred  
    ever occurred              almost constantly 
 
5. I’m concerned about my ability to debate others under pressure to form a 
 group opinion. 
 
Strongly Disagree     1    2    3    4    5    6    Strongly Agree 
 
 This thought hardly   1   2    3    4    5    6   This thought occurred  





6. I am focused on the positive benefits I will obtain from this situation. 
 
Strongly Disagree     1    2    3    4    5    6    Strongly Agree 
 
 This thought hardly   1   2    3    4    5    6   This thought occurred  
    ever occurred              almost constantly 
 
 
7. I am thinking about the consequences of performing poorly. 
 
Strongly Disagree     1    2    3    4    5    6    Strongly Agree 
 
 This thought hardly   1   2    3    4    5    6   This thought occurred  
    ever occurred              almost constantly 
 
8. I am thinking about the consequences of doing well. 
 
Strongly Disagree     1    2    3    4    5    6    Strongly Agree 
 
 This thought hardly   1   2    3    4    5    6   This thought occurred  
    ever occurred              almost constantly 
 
 
PART II (Coping Expectancy):  
 
How do you think you will cope with the demands of this situation (circle a number 
from 1-6)? 
 
Very confident can      1    2    3    4    5    6    Very concerned  
 cope effectively             whether can cope 
 
 
Little confidence in    1    2    3    4    5    6    Strong confidence in ability 
ability to avoid failure      to avoid failure 
 
 
Little confidence in     1    2    3    4    5    6     Strong confidence in ability to  





















 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
2.  Apprehensive 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
3.  Anxious 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
4.  Uncertain 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
5.  Friendly 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
6.  Trusting 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
7.  Comfortable 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
8.  Threatened 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
9.  Confident 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
10.  Awkward 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
11.  Safe 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
 
12.  At Ease 





Experimenter Script for Experiment 1 
 
 
If possible, try to look up participants’ opinions in mass testing file before they arrive, 
and decide what the make-up of discussion group (majority opinion vs. minority 
opinion) will be.  Also decide which article (for or against gay marriage) will be used. 
If they are not in the data file, or if you don’t have time, you can get their opinion at 
the beginning when they complete the social issue questionnaire. Remember to try to 
counterbalance all of the different conditions (i.e. which article they get (court 
upholds “traditional marriage” definition vs. court overturns “traditional marriage 
definition”) and group status (majority vs. minority status)). We want to try to get 
equal numbers in each condition. 
 
When participants arrive, greet them and check their names off on the printed sign up 
sheet. Tell 1 or both (if they are both there): “We are still waiting for two more 
subject(s) to show up.  While we’re waiting, I’m going to go ahead and get you 
started on the first part of the experiment. If you could just come with me into this 
room and have a seat.  (NOTE: If one or both arrive late, tell them that you have 
already got the others started in another room.) 
 
Place the participant (or participants) in separate lab rooms. 
 
Go to first lab room. Tell them: 
 
“My name is _______________ . Thanks for coming today.  
 
“As you know, you will be participating in our psychology experiment about group 
decision making. This study is designed to simulate the process that a group, for 
example, a jury, might go through when trying to reach a consensus on an important 
issue.” 
 
“Please be aware that this is a joint project between the psych department and the 
journalism department. We are working with their researchers and the school 
newspaper on this project. They are currently interested in studying students’ 
opinions on various social issues. In the psych department, we are specifically 
interested in studying the process that people might go through when trying to reach a 
group decision on an important social issue.” 
 
“You will first be asked to read a news article about a recent court decision on a 
current social issue, and indicate whether you agree or disagree with the Court’s 
decision. You will also be asked to fill out a few surveys for us. Then, you will 





“As a group, you will be asked to discuss the issue, and then form a group opinion on 
whether the group is for or against the issue. You will have to take a vote as to the 
group’s final position. The majority’s position at the end of the discussion will be the 
group’s final opinion. We encourage you to strive for a consensus. Once the group’s 
opinion has been decided, you will work together to write a group opinion on the 
issue. You will also be asked to write a statement of your individual opinion as well.” 
 
“We want you to be aware that all of the written opinions will be shared with the 
journalism dept., but your personal information and identity will not be shared. 
Excerpts from these statements may be published in the school newspaper and may 
influence other students. Again, your name and any other personal information will 
be kept private and will not be given to the newspaper. “ 
 
“If you have any questions now or at any time during the experiment, please feel free 
to ask them.” 
 
“OK, let’s get started. Please go ahead and read and sign this consent form. It tells 
you what you’ll be doing, that you can withdraw with no penalty, and who you can 
contact if you have any questions or concerns.” 
 
Hand them the consent form to sign. Take it from them after they sign it, and hand 
them the social issue survey. Tell them: 
 
“I have to go get the article for you to read. Please complete this brief social issue 
survey while I am gone. Also, please do not talk or discuss the issue with each other 
while I’m gone. You will be able to discuss the issue when we get to the group 
discussion. I’ll be right back. 
 
Go get the article and return to the lab room. Make sure to get the social issue survey 
from them at this time. Then hand them the article and say: 
 
“Here is a recent news article we’d like you to read. Please check at the bottom 
whether you agree or disagree with the opinion. If you are undecided or not sure of 
your opinion, please check the answer that is closest to your opinion. Remember, you 
guys will be asked to debate the issue and form a group opinion, just like a jury would 
have to do, so please read the article carefully and seriously think about your opinion 
on this issue. The majority opinion will be the group’s final decision. Do you have 
any questions?” 
 
“Go ahead and begin, and I’ll be back in a few minutes. I’m going make sure the 
other participants are here and get them started. If you finish before then, just wait for 
me to return.” (If they showed up late, tell them you are going to check on the other 





Return to room a few minutes later. Collect court case articles. Bring the group 
interaction surveys and the opinion assessment with you for each participant. Remind 
them:  
 
“In just a few minutes, we’re going to have you to participate in the group discussion 
and talk about this court case.  Remember, as a group, you’ll be asked to decide 
whether or not you agree with the judges’ ruling, and the majority opinion will be the 
final decision. I also want to remind all of you to be respectful towards each other, 
even if you disagree on the issue.” 
 
TO MINORITY: “I wanted to bring that up because it looks like, based on your 
response to the survey question, that nobody else in the group agrees with you; 
you are the only one who took this position.” 
 
TO MAJORITY:  “I wanted to bring that up because it looks like, based on your 
response to the survey question, that everyone in the group agrees with you 
except for one person; everyone else shares your opinion.” 
 
“While you are waiting, I’d also like you to fill out a few group interaction surveys 
for us, as well as a more detailed opinion assessment, expressing how you personally 
feel about this issue. Remember, all written opinions may be submitted anonymously 
to the school newspaper and published, either in part or in their entirety. I will be 
back in a few minutes. Please wait here if you finish before I return. I also ask, again, 
that you do not discuss this issue with each other at this time. Once everyone has 
finished with these surveys, I’ll come back and get you, and move you to another 
room. Then we’ll begin the group discussion.”  
 
I have one more thing I’d like you to do. I’m going to put you in back separate rooms 
to do this part.” Put them in their rooms and tell them: 
 
Return to the lab room and collect the forms. Say, “Before we have the discussion, I 
have one more question for you. If you could just answer this for me… Hand them 
suspicion/manipulation check form. Then say: 
 
“At this point, we’ve actually come to the end of the experiment. We’re not actually 
going to have a discussion at all (although we did that in the past, we have eliminated 
it this semester). There was more to this experiment than you were led to believe. I’d 
like to tell you what this was really about.” 
 
“Please read this debriefing sheet.”  Give them 30 seconds or so, and then debrief 
them and explain what the experiment was about. Thank them for coming, and ask 
them if they have any final questions. Assure them that we are not interested in 
how much they are for or against the issue, and we are not trying to change their 
opinions. We are just interested in how people react when they perceive they are 
in the majority or minority, and how that affects the structure of their written 




argument after perceiving they are in the minority, because they might feel a 
little threatened in anticipation of a group discussion. Tell them we were not 
working with the journalism department, or the school paper; that it was all 
part of a cover story to make them take the experiment seriously. Their opinions 
won’t be shared with anyone. 
 
Ask them not to discuss the experiment with anyone, so that they don’t give 
away our hypothesis. 
 
“We’ll give you credit on the web site, but here is a credit slip for your records.” Be 







Sample Court Decision Article #1 (Upholds Traditional Marriage) 
 
October 21, 2007 
 
Lawsuit Fails to Overturn State Marriage Law 
 
CLEVELAND– The Ohio Supreme Court voted 4 to 3 to uphold the state’s current 
law, which limits marriage to a union between a man and a woman. They ruled that 
same-sex couples may not defy state law and seek license for same-sex unions. The 
three justices who were in the minority opinion suggested that the issue will be an 
ongoing civil rights struggle. However, the four-justice majority stated in their 
opinion that the court does not have the right to invalidate a state law, based on 
constitutional grounds, that prohibits these types of unions.  
 
“This is just the beginning of our fight against those seeking to change the traditional 
definition of marriage,” said Michael Roberts, President of the Vote to Save Marriage 
Coalition. “We expect to see an increase in litigation across the country regarding 
same-sex marriage and states’ rights.”  
 
This case has been called a “critically important” suit by those in powerful legal 
circles, and lawyers have already filed an appeal to a federal court. One anonymous 
government official believes this is the case that will eventually be heard by the U.S. 
Supreme Court on this issue. Many same-sex marriage activists believe this is a 
strong case for them, and that the highest court will likely choose to hear it on appeal. 
Not only is it likely to be tried before the highest court in the land, but it will also set 
a strong legal precedent for states like Pennsylvania and Maryland, who are also 
considering this issue. 
 
Although nobody can predict whether the Supreme Court will indeed hear the case, or 
what their verdict will be, it is certain that debate over this hotly contested issue is not 
going to go away anytime soon. This is a defining values issue that the country must 






Sample Court Decision Article #2 (Overturns Traditional Marriage) 
 
October 21, 2007 
 





CLEVELAND– The Ohio Supreme Court voted 4 to 3 yesterday to overturn the 
state’s current law which limits marriage to a union between a man and a woman. 
They ruled that same-sex couples are legally entitled to seek licenses for same-sex 
marriages, based on the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The three 
justices who were in the minority opinion suggested that the issue will be an ongoing 
civil rights struggle. However, the four-justice majority stated in their opinion that the 
court does the right to invalidate a state law, based on constitutional grounds, that 
prohibits these types of unions.  
 
“This is just the beginning of our fight against those seeking to change the traditional 
definition of marriage,” said Michael Roberts, President of the Right to Marriage 
Coalition. “We expect to see an increase in litigation across the country regarding 
same-sex marriage and states’ rights.”  
 
This case has been called a “critically important” suit by those in powerful legal 
circles, and lawyers have already filed an appeal to a federal court. One anonymous 
government official believes this is the case that will eventually be heard by the U.S. 
Supreme Court on this issue. Many activists who oppose same-sex marriage believe 
this is a strong case for them, and that the highest court will likely choose to hear it on 
appeal. Not only is it likely to be tried before the highest court in the land, but it will 
also set a strong legal precedent for states like Pennsylvania and Maryland, who are 
also considering this issue. 
 
Although nobody can predict whether the Supreme Court will indeed hear the case, or 
what their verdict will be, it is certain that debate over this hotly contested issue is not 
going to go away anytime soon. This is a defining values issue that the country must 





Do you agree with the Court’s decision?  
 







Multiple–Choice Measures of Integrative Complexity 
Version A: (For those who support same-sex marriage) 
 
Please read all of the statements below, and select ONE statement that most 
closely represents your opinion on same-sex marriage.  Please put an “X” next to 
the statement you selected. Please select one statement only. 
 
___ I am for gay marriage because we are all born equal. Gay people are just as 
human as any straight person and deserve the same rights. 
 
___I can see how each opinion on gay marriage has developed over time and why it is 
so hard to come to a consensus.  From the evolutionary perspective gay marriage is a 
maladaptive behavior as no offspring will become of such a relationship and the goal 
of passing on one’s genes will be unfulfilled.  From a religious perspective, many 
perceive that it is morally wrong. On the other hand, true love, whether it is gay or 
heterosexual, is the essence of what being in a relationship is all about.  These 
conflicting viewpoints have existed throughout our history and will not be resolved 
until the basis them is understood by both sides.  Once a mutual understanding is 
achieved the question of whether to allow gay marriage will be achieved. 
 
___ I believe there should be a legal way for gay couples to get married.  They 
deserve the same recognition as heterosexual marriages.  But I can also see why the 
legalization of gay couples may be seen as a bad thing.  To some people legal gay 
marriage is seen as publicly embracing sinful behavior. 
 
___In my opinion the issue of gay marriage has developed from a variety of issues 
involving religion, civil rights, evolution, and philosophy of love.  Some see gay 
marriage as a sin, others see it as a civil right.  What needs to be discussed first is 
whether the concept of marriage should be based on religious ideology or solely on 
the concept of what a relationship is. 
 
___ My opinion on gay marriage is  that you might be in favor of it or opposed to it, 
based on whether you view it as a civil or religious issue.  Those who view it as a 
civil issue tend to be for it because they feel it is a right to marry who you want.  
Those with a religious viewpoint tend to be against it because they believe 
homosexuality is a sin.  There will continue to be a sharp division between these 
opposing forces until they both sit down and talk.  Only when they discuss their 
differences and reach a compromise will the issue of gay marriage be put to rest. 
 
___ Gay couples should have the right to marry.  I think if two people are in love they 






___ I can see why gay marriage should be legalized because of the issue of denying 
couples their civil rights.  I can also understand why some oppose gay marriage as it 
is against their religion.  There should be a discussion between both sides to try and 
get a better understanding of the issue. 
Version B: (For those who oppose same-sex marriage) 
 
Please read all of the statements below, and select ONE statement that most 
closely represents your opinion on same-sex marriage.  Please put an “X” next to 
the statement you selected. Please select one statement only. 
___ I don’t think gay marriage should be allowed, but I can also see why some think 
it should be. I think both sides should try to work something out. 
___There should be a law against gay marriage, because marriage is a union between 
a man and a woman.  On the other hand, there should be something in place that 
recognizes the commitment of two loving individuals even if they are of the same 
sex. 
___ I just think gay marriage is wrong. Marriage between two men or two women 
isn’t natural.  
___My opinion on gay marriage is that you might be in favor of it or opposed to it, 
based on whether you view it as a civil or religious issue.  Those who view it as a 
civil issue tend to be for it because they feel it is a right to marry who you want.  
Those with a religious viewpoint tend to be against it because they believe 
homosexuality is a sin.  There will continue to be a sharp division between these 
opposing forces until they both sit down and talk.  Only when they formally discuss 
their differences and reach a compromise will the issue of gay marriage be put to rest. 
___I am strongly against gay marriage, but there may be a problem using religious or 
moral reasons to make a law against it. 
___In my opinion the issue of gay marriage has developed from a variety of issues 
involving religion, civil rights, evolution, and philosophy of love.  Some see gay 
marriage as a sin, others see it as a civil right.  What needs to be discussed first is 
whether the concept of marriage should be based on religious ideology or solely on 
the concept of what a relationship is. 
___I can see how each opinion on gay marriage has developed over time and why it is 
so hard to come to a consensus.  From the evolutionary perspective gay marriage is a 
maladaptive behavior as no offspring will become of such a relationship and the goal 
of passing on one’s genes will be unfulfilled.  From a religious perspective, many 
perceive that it is morally wrong. On the other hand, true love, whether it is gay or 
heterosexual, is the essence of what being in a relationship is all about.  These 




until the basis them is understood by both sides.  Once a mutual understanding is 
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